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MARC EDELMAN* & JOHN T. HOLDEN**
ABSTRACT
With legal sports betting viewed as a panacea for state budget woes
across the United States, the underlying data that fuels the sports
betting industry has emerged as an especially valuable asset. In the
hopes of capitalizing on state laws that have now legalized sports
betting, United States professional sports leagues have attempted to
gain exclusive ownership rights over valuable sports betting data by
asking legislators to mandate that bookmakers exclusively use data
sold through the league. In addition, some sports leagues have im-
posed policies mandating that teams bundle together their collected
data for purposes of selling it exclusively through the league to third
parties, and, on the league level, compiling sports data rights with
other desirable league rights—all with the hopes of allowing the
league to gain control over all data pertaining to their sport, and
thus, indirectly, sports betting.
These efforts by the United States professional sports leagues to
potentially monopolize sports data markets raise novel questions
both in terms of who, if anyone, owns the property rights to sports
data and what efforts, if any, are needed to prevent sports leagues
from improperly gaining control over sports data markets. This
Article proposes that the United States professional sports leagues’
recent attempts to collectivize the sale of sports game data and
prevent non-league-affiliated entities from competing in the markets
to collect, aggregate, and resell game data gives rise to both legal and
policy concerns under federal antitrust laws. In particular, this
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York; Adjunct Professor, Fordham Law School, Email: Marc@MarcEdelman.com.
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Article analyzes whether the league-wide sale of sports game data
should be viewed as a form of collusion among individual sports
teams that may potentially violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, and
whether league-wide efforts to secure exclusive rights to sell sports
game data should constitute a potential form of exclusionary conduct
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.
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INTRODUCTION
Data is the fuel that powers the sports betting industry.1 In
recent years, sports betting has become increasingly reliant on
technology.2 The demand for faster, more accurate, and more robust
data by bookmakers and bettors began in the 1980s and has
continued to increase through today.3 While both the legal and
illegal betting markets rely on data with the same features, the
recent expansion of legal sports betting in the United States in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v. National Col-
legiate Athletic Ass’n,4 has spurred the industry as a whole and
made data an investible resource.5 The recent expansion of legalized
gambling into more than twenty states transpired so rapidly that a
few well-positioned companies, with the help of professional sports
leagues, have acquired dominant market positions while others are
playing catch-up.6 The ability for states to legalize sports betting
marked a turning point for sports leagues that had long opposed
legalized betting, and it even fueled the lawsuits that eventually
resulted in the repeal of the Professional and Amateur Sports
1. See James Glanz & Agustin Armendariz, When Sports Betting Is Legal, the Value
of Game Data Soars, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/
sports/sports-betting.html [https://perma.cc/HCJ2-ZVED] (describing the role that data plays
in “feeding betting sites”).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484-85 (2018).
5. One sports data company was valued at $2.4 billion in 2018 and attracted investments
from Washington Wizards owner Ted Leonsis, Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban, and
NBA star Michael Jordan. Dustin Gouker, Sports Data Company Sportradar Now Valued at
$2.4 Billion with New Investors, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (July 9, 2018), https://www.legalsports
report.com/21837/sportradar-deal-2-4-billion-valuation/ [https://perma.cc/25GJ-9VBL].
6. For instance, in less than a year following the Supreme Court’s Murphy decision, two
sportsbook operators, FanDuel and DraftKings, had acquired 83 percent of the market share
in New Jersey. Alex Sherman, Legal Gambling from Your Phone Could Be a $150 Billion
Market, but Making It Happen Will Be Tough, CNBC (Apr. 29, 2019, 4:07 PM), https://www.
cnbc.com/2019/04/27/fanduel-draftkings-race-to-win-150-billion-sports-betting-market.html
[https://perma.cc/X65D-D48H]. Relatedly, as a few sportsbooks were gaining a dominant
market position, so too were data suppliers, with one supplier purportedly acquiring 90
percent of the sports betting data market in New Jersey by March 2019. Matt Rybaltowski,
As Offshore Books Operate Unchecked, Demand for Sports Betting Data Knows No Boundaries.
That’s an Issue, SPORTSHANDLE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-
data-distribution-offshore-sportsbooks/ [https://perma.cc/B5RS-NGGP].
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Protection Act (PASPA), which allowed states to begin legalizing the
practice.7 Sports leagues have not so quietly begun seeking to gain
a piece of the sports betting pie, first demanding that jurisdictions
legalizing sports betting pay the leagues a so-called integrity fee,8
before pivoting to having legislators mandate that bookmakers use
data that is sold by league partners.9 These mandates are only the
most recent efforts by sports leagues to consolidate control of in-
formation resulting from games they facilitate.10
The major American professional sports leagues have long faced
opposition to their efforts to collectivize and sell team rights as a
bundle.11 The emergence of legal sports gambling has created a rush
to parcel and sell a new item under a single umbrella—game data.12
7. See generally John T. Holden, North American Sports Leagues and Gambling Policy:
A Comparative Analysis, 14 INT’LSPORTS L.J. 242, 242 (2014) (describing historical opposition
from the major American sports leagues to sports gambling liberalization policies in the
United States and Canada).
8. See John Holden & Mike Schuster, The Sham of Integrity Fees in Sports Betting, 16
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 31, 37 (2019) (noting that the first bill to include an integrity fee appeared
in January 2018, before the Supreme Court decision in Murphy, and would have mandated
that all wagers placed in Indiana result in effectively 1 percent of the amount wagered being
remitted to the relevant league).
9. See John Holden, Can Leagues Own Data Rights When It Comes to US Sports Betting?,
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (May 28, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/20745/leagues-and-
fees-in-sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/T2RD-DLF7] (noting the sports leagues’ transition
from demanding integrity fees to mandating the use of official league data providers for
certain types of wagers).
10. Sports leagues have a long history of attempting to control the use and dissemination
of information derived from sporting events. See generally Marc Edelman, Lack of Integrity?
Rebutting the Myth That U.S. Commercial Sports Leagues Have an Intellectual Property Right
to Sports Gambling Proceeds, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 5-7 (2018) (describing efforts to use
copyright protections to assert ownership over sports information).
11. Marc Edelman, Sports Data Policies Could Represent Next Big Antitrust Challenge for
Pro Sports Leagues, FORBES (June 10, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marc
edelman/2019/06/10/ sports-data-policies-could-provide-next-big-antitrust-challenge-for-pro-
sports-leagues/ [https://perma.cc/8J7F-SCNZ]; see, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football
League, 560 U.S. 183, 187-88 (2010); In re Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust
Litig., 933 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 56 (2020); Chi. Pro. Sports
Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 596-97 (7th Cir. 1996); Laumann v. Nat’l
Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Previous lawsuits have centered
on broadcast rights, media rights, and merchandise sales. See Chi. Pro. Sports, 95 F.3d at 595
(broadcast rights); Madison Square Garden v. Nat’l Hockey League, No. 07 CV 8455, 2008 WL
4547518, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2008) (media rights); Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 187
(merchandise sales).
12. Edelman, supra note 11; Eric Ramsey, ‘Data Monopoly’ Key to Leagues’ Desired Con-
trol over US Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.legalsports
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To increase revenue, some leagues are using data distribution
partners to notify users who do not agree to increased fees that they
may be cut off.13 The efforts by various sports leagues to exert
pressure on data purchasers to pay increased fees raise important
antitrust questions for the regulators and consumers who will
ultimately bear the burdens of increased supply costs.14
Recent efforts to raise revenue by sports leagues like the National
Basketball Association (NBA), Major League Baseball (MLB), and
the Professional Golfers’ Association Tour (PGA Tour) have centered
on using their official data partners to extract rents from sportsbook
operators who rely on fast, accurate, and reliable data, while lob-
bying legislators to mandate that sportsbooks use only official
data.15 The result of this double barreled approach is a stifling of
competition in the market for sports data.16 While the sports leagues
appear to be granting nonexclusive licenses to a small handful of
data brokers, this is likely nothing more than an illusion of
competition in the data market.17 As long as the sports leagues con-
trol the spigot of data that is disseminating the information to select
providers, the leagues are able to dictate pricing and other condi-
tions antithetical to a robust and free market.18 The sports leagues’
desire to control sports data, despite the lack of an intellectual
property right in much of the data itself, has been referred to as
report.com/19047/data-monopoly-key-to-leagues-controlling-sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/
H9PU-BVXA].
13. Matt Rybaltowski, Shakedown Fees: NBA, MLB Demanding Nevada Sportsbooks Pay
More or Get Cut Off, SPORTSHANDLE (May 2, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/nba-mlb-
demands-data-fee-nv-sportsbooks/ [https://perma.cc/7V3X-AJHK] (describing sports league
efforts, via data distributors, to raise the fees paid by sportsbook operators for league data).
14. See Edelman, supra note 11.
15. At present, sports leagues have only been successful in securing limited mandates
requiring the use of official data. See Rybaltowski, supra note 13. For instance, Illinois,
Tennessee, and Michigan have mandated the use of official league data for some bets that
occur during the course of a game. Craig Mauger, Pro Leagues Score with Michigan’s New
Sports Betting Law, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 8, 2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.detroitnews.com/
story/news/local/michigan/2020/01/07/pro-sports-leagues-scored-michigans-sports-betting-
law/2805358001/ [https://perma.cc/PJH6-HM68].
16. See Brett Smiley, Antitrust Tripwires: Legal Expert Explains Sports Betting Data
Issues, SPORTSHANDLE (June 4, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-data-antitrust/
[https://perma.cc/HU9R-7ETZ].
17. See id. 
18. See id. (noting that sports leagues have strong lobbying power that may allow them
to control the flow of data by virtue of legislative barriers).
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“naked rent-seeking.”19 Though the leagues have only had moderate
success in lobbying state legislatures to mandate official data use for
certain types of wagers, this “rent-seeking” activity may eventually
become protected.20 However, the extension of this market position
into states without mandates creates antitrust questions worth
examining.21 Some sports leagues such as the National Football
League (NFL)—a part owner of one of the data distributors—have
asked that bookmakers remit a percentage of sportsbook profits to
the league as part of contracts for data.22 There are collusive
barriers to entry being created through official partnerships—
buttressed by legislative mandates that linger beyond state
borders.23 These barriers create a significant concern for the long-
term viability of an industry that is making a transition from an
almost entirely illegal market to a legal and regulated market at
warp speed.24
This Article proposes that the United States professional sports
leagues’ recent attempts to collectivize the sale of sports game data
to third-party buyers and prevent non-league-affiliated entities from
competing in the markets to collect, aggregate, and resell sports
game data gives rise to both legal and policy concerns under federal
antitrust laws. This Article proceeds in five main parts. Part I
explores the history of sports game data, the historical collection of
this data, and the historic sale of this data. Part II explains the wide
range of uses for sports game data in the modern era, where sports
gambling, traditional fantasy sports, and daily fantasy sports are
all an important part of many fans’ sports experience. Part III
describes the intellectual property rights (or lack thereof) that
extend to pure sports game data, as well as already collected and
aggregated data. Next, Part IV explores the league-wide sale of
19. Holden & Schuster, supra note 8, at 37 (referring to naked rent-seeking in the context
of integrity fees).
20. See Smiley, supra note 16.
21. See id.
22. Dustin Gouker, NFL Partner Is Asking US Sportsbooks to Pay for Official Data, LEGAL
SPORTS REP. (Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/35312/sportradar-asks-for-
official-data-money-for-nfl/ [https://perma.cc/4JWB-98XP].
23. See Smiley, supra note 16.
24. See John T. Holden & Marc Edelman, Regulating Vice: What the U.S. Marijuana
Industry Can Learn from State Governance of Sports Gambling, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. 1051,
1081.
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sports game data as a form of collusion among individual sports
teams that may potentially violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Finally, Part V analyzes league-wide efforts to secure exclusive
rights to sell sports game data. In doing so, Part V looks at the right
to sell sports game data as a potential form of exclusive conduct that
illegally leverages each league’s shared monopoly in the market to
host games in a given sport, and transforms it into a second shared
monopoly in the market to collect, aggregate, and resell sports game
data.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SPORTS INFORMATION
Sports information is now ubiquitous, but even before the advent
of modern sports analytics, people were keeping score.25 However,
sports information has undergone a number of transitions over the
last two centuries, beginning with an era of developing a means of
keeping track of final results and individual performance.26 The
transition from individualized scorekeeping and record keeping, to
publication of sports scores in newspapers, eventually to distri-
bution across national wire services, and then to near-instant
transmission over the internet, began in the 1800s and continues to
this day.27 The modern era of sports information has been driven by
25. For instance, there is evidence that scorekeeping, or at least ranking of competitors,
dates back to at least the Olympics in Ancient Greece, where Coroebus won the 192-meter
footrace, the only event at the time. The Olympic Games, HISTORY (Aug. 21, 2018), https://
www.history.com/topics/sports/olympic-games [https://perma.cc/773G-KCVY]; see also Holden
& Schuster, supra note 8, at 67 (noting the “ubiquity of sports information”).
26. In the 1700s, cricketers kept score using a notching post, recording runs by marking
an additional notch on a wooden post. John Thorn, Keeping Score, OUR GAME (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://ourgame.mlblogs.com/keeping-score-9895da4606df [https://perma.cc/53JA-BGHF]. This
scoring system would eventually evolve to a system in baseball where scorers use stan-
dardized scoring sheets to track the results of a game. Id.
27. See Ed Sherman, The Slow Death of Baseball Box Scores in Newspapers, POYNTER
(Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.poynter.org/reporting-editing/2015/the-slow-death-of-baseball-
box-scores-in-newspapers/ [https://perma.cc/Z5DC-JC9B] (describing the prominence of base-
ball box scores in newspapers as far back as the 1800s). Wire services are used to transmit
news, including sports scores, across the country (and in some instances across the globe). See
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 229 (1918). The Supreme Court described
the wire service business as follows:
[The service] gathers in all parts of the world, by means of various in-
strumentalities of its own, by exchange with its members, and by other ap-
propriate means, news and intelligence of current and recent events of interest
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a desire to collect and then present large amounts of data in a way
that yields novel insights, and in turn, this has led to the emergence
of an entire subfield revolving around sports analytics.28
A. Basic Scorekeeping 
Before it was possible to conduct advanced analytics and develop
derivative statistics yielding new insights and creating a multi-
billion dollar industry, sports needed a scoring system.29 The ancient
Olympics crowned winners with an olive branch wrapped into a
crown, and losers received nothing—a contrast to today’s Olympic
system, whereby medals are awarded for first, second, and third
place.30 While the ancient Olympics’ winner-take-all system afforded
a clear understanding of who was successful, the modern system of
sports scorekeeping has evolved to utilize all varieties of interval
measurement to rank teams, players, and even certain aspects of
players.31
Scorekeeping and the publication of American sports results date
back to the mid-1800s.32 In 1837, the Olympic Ball Club of Phila-
delphia, which played an early predecessor to baseball, mandated
the use of a scorebook to record runs scored by each team in their
constitution.33 Beginning in 1845, the New York Morning News
to newspaper readers and distributes it daily to its members for publication in
their newspapers.
Id.
28. While sports analytics is widely thought of as having its origins in the early 1970s,
many became familiar with the concept after the 2003 release of Michael Lewis’s book
MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME, which chronicled the use of statistical
analysis by Oakland Athletics’ general manager in order to gain a cost-effective competitive
advantage. James J. Cochran, The Emergence of Sports Analytics, ANALYTICS (Feb. 1, 2010),
https://pubsonline.informs.org/do/10.1287/LYTX.2010.01.06/full / [https://perma.cc/2YK6-
7JGT].
29. For an overview of the information that can be derived from basic sports statistics, see
generally TOBIAS J.MOSKOWITZ &L.JONWERTHEIM,SCORECASTING:THE HIDDEN INFLUENCES
BEHIND HOW SPORTS ARE PLAYED AND GAMES ARE WON (2011).
30. Jeremy Golubcow-Teglasi, The Olympic Medal: It’s All Greek to Us!, NAT’L ENDOW-
MENTHUMANS. (Nov. 13, 2009), https://edsitement.neh.gov/lesson-plans/olympic-medal-its-all-
greek-us [https://perma.cc/HX5H-WMNA].
31. See generally BENJAMIN C. ALAMAR, SPORTS ANALYTICS: A GUIDE FOR COACHES, MAN-
AGERS, AND OTHER DECISION MAKERS (2013) (providing an overview of sports analytics).
32. Thorn, supra note 26.
33. Alan Schwarz, A Numbers Revolution, ESPN (July 8, 2004), https://www.espn.com/
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began publishing a predecessor to the modern box score by includ-
ing a column listing each team’s batters and the runs they scored,
as well as the outs that they recorded.34 By 1858, box scores ex-
panded to include nine columns per player and provided additional
information on how outs were recorded.35
Baseball scorekeeping would evolve significantly in 1859, after an
English-born cricket reporter, Henry Chadwick, changed his focus
from cricket to baseball.36 Chadwick, who had been hired by the New
York Times to cover cricket, became enthralled with baseball after
watching a game in 1856.37 By 1859, Chadwick was covering the
sport for the New York Clipper and the Sunday Mercury.38 Chadwick
was instrumental in evolving the box score and in introducing a
variety of statistics, including runs, hits, and errors.39 Eventually,
Chadwick would develop other statistics as well, including the
unearned run and the concept of total bases.40 During the 1870s and
1880s, sports writers and the two prominent baseball leagues—the
American League and the National League—experimented with
keeping a variety of different statistics, some of which would prove
to be nearly a century ahead of their time.41
Statistics and scorekeeping continued to evolve throughout the
early twentieth century, and in 1912, the first register of player
batting and fielding statistics was made commercially available.42
This would be followed by a growing number of publications in the
following years.43 In 1918, a pair of brothers started a sports data
empire when they began selling baseball scores and statistics to









40. Schwarz, supra note 33.
41. See id. (noting that in 1887, the American and National Leagues counted walks as
hits, a measure that is now reflected in the on-base percentage statistic, which has gained
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would become the current Elias Sports Bureau, was the official data
distributor of the National League.45 By 1941, baseball scorekeeping
had become such a hobby that Ethan Allen began marketing All-
Star Baseball,46 an early predecessor to today’s fantasy sports.47
While other sports evolved much like baseball, so too did another
industry that relies on sports information—the bookmaking in-
dustry.48 Betting on sports dates back at least to the earliest
Olympics.49 It was, however, a history major from the University of
Chicago who introduced a statistical tweak that allowed for a new
type of wager—the point-spread bet.50 Charles McNeil, a banker
turned gambler, opened his own bookmaking operation in the
1940s.51 McNeil’s system involved rating the two teams playing and
then analyzing by how many points the favored team was likely to
win.52 McNeil originally designed the point-spread for football, but
would later adapt it to college basketball.53 While McNeil was forced
out of business by his fear of retribution by organized crime for his
monopolization of the betting industry, the point-spread has been a
staple of American wagering since the 1940s.54 The emergence and
early evolution of sports statistics created a following that in its
most pure form—scorekeeping by hand—remains present today.55
In a more nefarious form, sports statistics have fueled a fantasy
sports and gambling world worth billions of dollars.56 Overall, the
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. John T. Holden, Christopher M. McLeod & Marc Edelman, Regulatory Categorization
and Arbitrage: How Daily Fantasy Sports Companies Navigated Regulatory Categories Before
and After Legalized Gambling, 57 AM. BUS. L.J. 113, 125-26 (2020).
48. See Robert H. Boyle, The Brain That Gave Us the Point Spread, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Mar. 10, 1986), https://vault.si.com/vault/1986/03/10/the-brain-that-gave-us-the-point-spread
[https://perma.cc/G6HM-CDMS].
49. John T. Holden & Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Sports Gambling and the Law:
How America Regulates Its Most Lucrative Vice, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 907, 910.





55. See Baseball Basics: How to Keep Score, MLB, https://www.mlb.com/official-informa
tion/basics/score [https://perma.cc/K6S6-BFGP].
56. See John T. Holden, Regulating Sports Wagering, 105 IOWA L. REV. 575, 578 (2020)
(describing the size of the illegal sports gambling market); see also Brian Goff, The $70 Billion
Fantasy Football Market, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2013, 10:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
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success of today’s world of fantasy sports and sports gambling would
not have been possible without a means for distributing the sports-
related information.57
B. Early Distribution Era
The early distribution of sports data is closely tied to the growth
of sports journalism.58 Sports journalism in the United States began
in the 1820s and 1830s with an early focus on horse racing and
boxing.59 Early American sports journalism was concentrated in
magazines, with newspapers only addressing sports that had a
larger societal connection.60 As newspaper marketers sought a
means of appealing to a wide audience, they looked for industries
that would be of wide interest—amongst them was sports re-
porting.61 By 1883, the New York World had created the first sports
news department, and in 1895, the New York Journal was the first
newspaper to dedicate an entire section to sports.62
Between 1880 and 1920, coverage of sports in American newspa-
pers grew from .04 percent to between 12 and 20 percent of the total
volume of newspaper space.63 The 1920s, which was dubbed the
“Golden Era” of sports journalism, was when sports coverage took
a narrative turn and newspapers began printing play-by-play recaps
of sporting events.64 The emergence of competing mediums like
television and radio changed the way that newspapers delivered
their narrative.65 New mediums necessitated a means for reporters
to file stories from road games where the reporters would travel
briangoff/2013/08/20/the-70-billion-fantasy-football-market/ [https://perma.cc/D7NA-XYAE].
57. See Goff, supra note 56.
58. See Brian P. Moritz, The History of Sports Journalism (Part 1 of 3), SPORTS MEDIA
GUY (May 9, 2017), https://www.sportsmediaguy.com/blog/2017/5/9/the-history-of-sports-
journalism-part-1-of-3 [https://perma.cc/M6JP-YXRF].
59. Id.
60. Id. (noting such events included a horse race that featured a horse from the American
North and a horse from the American South).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Brian P. Moritz, The History of Sports Journalism (Part 2 of 3), SPORTS MEDIA GUY
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with teams and then use Western Union telegrams to transmit their
stories back to their offices to be printed.66
Indeed, much like the Western Union telegram and telegraph
systems being used for news reporting, in the early to mid-1900s
there was also a rise in the use of wire services to disseminate horse
racing and sports results to bookmakers.67 The wire service allowed
for the “rapid dissemination of racing information.”68 According to
a 1953 student note in the Stanford Law Review, the Continental
Press Service facilitated the wire service that was used by bookmak-
ers, but the service operated under the guise of being the seller of
news as opposed to bookmaking information:69
Continental did not sell information directly to the bookmakers.
Its customers were news-distribution services located in dif-
ferent parts of the country, each having an area to serve. These
distributors made arrangements with “news services” who
assumed the position of subdistributors. Continental made
agreements with the distributors by which it would deliver to
the subdistributors. Thus the subdistributors assumed the role
of creditor beneficiaries of a third-party beneficiary contract.
Continental appeared to be engaged in the honorable calling of
selling news. Although the news was of virtually no value to the
subdistributor except for resale to bookmakers, the use to which
Continental’s customers put the news could be considered their
own business.70
The Continental Press Service was, however, not the only wire
service operating at the time; Western Union also provided a ticker
service that delivered inning-by-inning information from baseball
games around the country.71 After a battle that took more than a
decade, Congress secured a bill that criminalized the use of wire
services for the interstate transmission of gambling information.72
66. Id.
67. See John T. Holden, Through the Wire Act, 95 WASH. L. REV. 677, 694-95 (2020).
68. Note, Racing Wire Service, 5 STAN. L. REV. 493, 493 (1953).
69. Id. at 494.
70. Id.
71. Holden, supra note 67, at 698.
72. See DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMING PROHIBITION AND THE INTER-
NET 80-116 (2005); see also Holden, supra note 67, at 692-712 (providing a detailed descrip-
tion of the various efforts to criminalize the use of wire communication facilities to transmit
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The Wire Act, passed in 1961, banned the use of interstate wire
communication facilities for the transmission of information that
assists in placing of bets or wagers.73 The statute, however, did
protect the transmission of information for use in legitimate news
reporting.74 The Wire Act would serve as a marginal impediment for
the dissemination of wagering information while sports betting
remained largely illegal in the United States.75 In present times, the
Wire Act appears to serve largely as an obstacle to a robust legal
market.76 In the era prior to the advent of widespread legal sports
wagering, sports information underwent a radical transformation
from the early box scores and game narratives.77
C. Advanced Analytics
While many associated the rise of advanced analytics in sports
with the Oakland A’s general manager Billy Beane and Michael
Lewis’s book Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game, the
origins of statisticians providing unique insights into sports extends
to at least the 1940s when the Brooklyn Dodgers executive, Branch
Rickey, hired a statistician named Allan Roth to analyze player per-
formance.78 Roth would become baseball’s first full-time statistician
wagering information prior to the passage of the Wire Act in 1961).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).
74. Id. § 1084(b) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission
in interstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting of sporting events
or contests, or for the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers
on a sporting event or contest from a State or foreign country where betting on that sporting
event or contest is legal into a State or foreign country in which such betting is legal.”).
75. It has been estimated that the illegal sports gambling market could have ballooned
to several hundred billion dollars while sports gambling remained largely illegal in the United
States; as such, it is unlikely many would call the Wire Act a successful piece of legislation.
See Holden, supra note 67, at 679 n.8 (noting that there is an inherent challenge in estimating
the size of the illegal market).
76. See John Holden, Opinion: Clarity Long Overdue on US Sports Betting Laws, LEGAL
SPORTS REP. (June 19, 2020), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/37280/us-sports-betting-
law-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/3VEC-PWCA] (noting that the Wire Act creates redun-
dancies for companies who operate within the law while allowing those who disregard the law
a competitive advantage as a result of nonenforcement).
77. See generally Mike Pesca, The Man Who Made Baseball’s Box Score a Hit, NPR
(July 30, 2009, 12:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106891539
[https://perma.cc/F2F5-WALH] (describing the advent of Henry Chadwick’s box score and it
serving as a predecessor to more advanced metrics).
78. A Guide to Sabermetric Research, SOC’Y FOR AM. BASEBALL RSCH., https://sabr.org/
84 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:069
and was instrumental in changing how people thought about base-
ball performance.79 In 1977, Bill James decided to share some of his
research about baseball that he had developed in part while working
at a pork and beans plant in Lawrence, Kansas; his work would be
instrumental in bringing about a widespread change in how base-
ball was thought about and talked about.80
Bill James would begin sharing his thoughts about baseball by
self-publishing a book annually, called the Bill James Baseball
Abstract.81 James named his new form of statistical analysis
Sabermetrics, after the Society for American Baseball Research
(SABR).82 By the mid-1990s, James’s publications and his way of
thinking about baseball had begun to attract attention.83 In 2003,
James was hired as a statistician by the Boston Red Sox and
eventually helped bring the Red Sox their first World Series win
since they infamously sold Babe Ruth to the New York Yankees in
1918.84
James played an instrumental role in changing the conventional
wisdom of thinking about not only baseball, but sports in general.85
There has been a recent move across sports to increase the role that
analytics play within an organization, and while some teams choose
to place less emphasis on analytics than more traditional methods
like scouting, analytics has a presence in nearly every professional
sports front office in the United States.86 The attention being paid
sabermetrics [https://perma.cc/ACQ9-B9TW].
79. Tom Cronin, Allan Roth: Baseball’s Forgotten Innovative Thinker, STATLINERS,
https://statliners.com/2015/03/23/allan-roth-baseballs-forgotten-innovative-thinker/
[https://perma.cc/FZ3R-PPW8].
80. Ben McGrath, The Professor of Baseball, NEW YORKER (July 14, 2003), https://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2003/07/14/the-professor-of-baseball [https://perma.cc/3397-GTLJ].





84. See Jason Kelly, Red Sox Need to Permanently Separate Themselves from Bill James,
BASEBALLESSENTIAL (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.baseballessential.com/news/2019/02/08/red-
sox-need-to-permanently-separate-themselves-from-bill-james/ [https://perma.cc/ZJE2-2WCR].
85. See Kevin Clark, The NFL’s Analytics Revolution Has Arrived, RINGER (Dec. 19, 2018,
12:08 PM), https://www.theringer.com/nfl/2018/12/19/18148153/nfl-analytics-revolution
[https://perma.cc/J3QK-EVPM] (describing the emergence and increasing influence of analy-
tics on the NFL).
86. See, e.g., Albert Breer, How All 32 NFL Teams Handle Analytics, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
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to statistics in the advanced analytics era has also been welcomed
by professional gamblers and daily fantasy sports participants.87
The emergence of widespread legal gambling and the related
daily fantasy sports industry has changed societal views regarding
how sports gambling is discussed, generally making the subject
more acceptable.88 The daily fantasy sports industry, however,
revealed very quickly after its emergence that the dominant
participants, dubbed “sharks,” used algorithms to design optimal
lineups and entered them into hundreds of contests, maximizing
their returns on investment.89 The top daily fantasy participants
relied on computerized scripts and bots to enter lineups in order to
maximize the number of entries.90 But, while daily fantasy sports
emerged as a more palatable version of sports gambling, the top
sports gamblers were using their own statistical analysis shortly
after advanced analytics were acknowledged in professional sports.91
Indeed, as far back as the 1980s, top gamblers were using so-
phisticated analytics in an effort to yield more successful results.92
In 1985, the FBI conducted a multi-state raid aimed at crippling a
gambling syndicate known as the “Computer Group.”93 The Comput-
er Group relied heavily on a former Pentagon contractor named
Michael Kent who began building computer programs to predict
(June 28, 2017), https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/06/28/nfl-analytics-front-office-old-school-ap
proach-draft-game-planning-charting [https://perma.cc/X8ET-345U] (describing the reliance
of all thirty-two NFL teams on analytics in team decision-making).
87. See Drew Harwell, All the Reasons You (Probably) Won’t Win Money Playing Daily
Fantasy Sports, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-switch/wp/2015/10/12/all-the-reasons-you-probably-wont-win-money-playing-daily-
fantasy-sports/ [https://perma.cc/S4CX-DQAB].
88. See Holden et al., supra note 47, at 135-54 (describing the similarities between daily
fantasy sports and gambling, and how daily fantasy sports companies compared themselves
to gambling when it was convenient).
89. Harwell, supra note 87.
90. Id.
91. Cf. John T. Holden & Simon A. Brandon-Lai, Advertised Incentives for Participation
in Daily Fantasy Sports Contests in 2015 and 2016: Legal Classification and Consumer
Implications, ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 6-8 (2017), https://entsportslawjournal.com/article/id/842
[https://perma.cc/C25K-JFGX] (describing the advertising strategies of daily fantasy sports
companies that publicized a number of features such as financial incentives in playing daily
fantasy sports, which are also closely associated with sports gambling).
92. Tomas Rios, The Godfathers of Sports Betting, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 13, 2017, 6:18 PM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-godfathers-of-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/86D5-E4Z4].
93. Id.
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college football outcomes in the late 1970s.94 While the Computer
Group would eventually expand around the country and rely on a
high volume of bets to be profitable, the group met its downfall after
failing to pay taxes.95 Some of the analytical insights gained by
gamblers have even attracted the attention of professional sports
executives. For instance, the Dallas Mavericks named former
professional sports bettor Bob Voulgaris as the team’s Director of
Quantitative Research and Development in 2018.96 While both the
sports world and the derivative gambling world have been at the
forefront of modernizing sports information, it appears that many
in the professional sports world already have their eyes set on the
next frontier: proprietary information.97
D. Future of Sports Data
If advanced analytics, algorithms, and artificial intelligence are
the present for sports information, the future is likely to include the
use of biometrics and increased speed of transmission (low or zero
latency) from stadiums to buyers or viewers around the globe.98
While the sale of biometric data as part of data packages is a
controversial topic, the subject has already been on the minds of
sports executives for several years.99 The commercial value of the
data is not yet ascertained, but both sports leagues’ and players
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Dalton Trigg, Betting on Bob Voulgaris: The Mavs ‘Analytical Advantage’ That Isn’t
Being Talked About Enough, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.si.com/nba/
mavericks/news/betting-on-bob-voulgaris-the-mavs-analytical-advantage-that-isnt-being-
talked-about-enough [https://perma.cc/3WLZ-J7RY].
97. See Matt Rybaltowski, Under Pressure: Stakeholders Feeling the Sweat as Sports
Betting Data War Escalates, SPORTSHANDLE (May 10, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/under-
pressure-stakeholders-data-war/ [https://perma.cc/3CC3-SM4A] (describing efforts by sports
leagues to claim data as proprietary).
98. See, e.g., Jacob Gershman, The Brave New World of Betting on Athletes’ Data, WALL
ST.J. (Mar. 10, 2020, 10:02 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-brave-new-world-of-betting-
on-athletes-data-11583848891 [https://perma.cc/CLM5-WRQV] (noting the potential future
market for betting on athletes’ biometric data).
99. See John Holden, The Major Issues Behind Biometric Data and Its Potential in Legal
Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 5, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32915/
biometric-data-legal-sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/9KT2-KX9U] (discussing the 2019 Sports
Lawyers Association Conference, where representatives from sports leagues debated bio-
metric data collection and ownership of the information).
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associations’ interest in ownership of the data being collected likely
extends beyond privacy interests, and into a future where the data
could be commodified.100 The other major improvement that is likely
to drive the future of sports information is the decrease in trans-
mission times, and a move towards zero latency, or truly real-time
delivery.101 Eliminating lag times in the delivery of information is
consequential for sports betting operators who frequently must ad-
just betting lines before so-called “courtsiders” can relay information
to confederates placing bets outside of the stadium.102 Delays in
disseminating information from the stadium to sportsbook opera-
tors can be costly.103
II. USES FOR SPORTS DATA
Sports data has evolved since the mid-1800s when the Olympic
Ball Club of Philadelphia first used a scorebook to record runs
scored by each team.104 Since this time, there has been an increased
reliance on the use of data for decision-making in sports.105 While
there is anecdotal evidence of some teams using statisticians and
data science to make decisions years ahead of others, the recent rise
in data science has become more pronounced, with nearly all teams
across major sports having an analytics department or advisors.106
100. See Brant James, Biometrics: Currency, Conundrum in Sports Betting Future,
GAMBLING.COM (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.gambling.com/news/biometrics-currency-conun
drum-in-sports-betting-future-1693000 [https://perma.cc/E67L-EDMY] (describing potential
interest in biometric information).
101. See generally Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Online Sports Are About to Get Actual Real-
Time Streaming, ZDNET (Sept. 14, 2018, 8:05 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/online-
sports-are-about-to-get-actual-real-time-streaming/ [https://perma.cc/9LG8-GH75] (describing
the concept of actual real-time streaming).
102. See Ryan M. Rodenberg, John T. Holden & Asa D. Brown, Real-Time Sports Data and
the First Amendment, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 63, 75-79 (2015) (describing the practice
of courtsiding).
103. See Matt Rybaltowski, As States Consider Anti-Courtsiding Measures, Debate on
Transmission of Live Data Intensifies, SPORTSHANDLE (July 10, 2019), https://sportshandle.
com/state-anti-courtsiding-measures/ [https://perma.cc/N6MP-XHWR] (describing the practice
of courtsiding and legislative efforts to curb the practice).
104. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Stephen Pritchard, Marginal Gains: The Rise of Data Analytics in Sport,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2015, 11:09 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/jan/22/
marginal-gains-the-rise-of-data-analytics-in-sport [https://perma.cc/LBV4-LCJN] (describing
the incorporation of data analytics programs in sports).
106. See Eric S. Hintz, Branch Rickey, Baseball Innovator, SMITHSONIAN (Jan. 17, 2020),
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Despite a resistance to change from some decision makers,107 re-
liance on data analysis is the future of sports information, and the
faster and more reliable the data, the more valuable it is.108 Overall,
this Part will explore data analytics in the context of player per-
formance, scouting, fantasy sports, and gambling.
A. Player Performance
Sports data, and in particular analytics, is most commonly
associated with player performance and the ability to evaluate a
player in comparison to other players.109 While American sports,
particularly baseball, have long been intertwined with statistics
and keeping score, the modern emergence of data analytics in
sports has called into question some of baseball’s most established
benchmarks for success, including batting average and pitcher
wins.110 In an era before salary caps and luxury taxes, conventional
https://invention.si.edu/branch-rickey-baseball-innovator [https://perma.cc/8REV-5KGZ]
(describing Branch Rickey’s innovations including his employment of Allan Roth to conduct
statistical analyses); see also Sam Fortier, The NFL’s Analytics Movement Has Finally
Reached the Sport’s Mainstream, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2020, 1:50 PM), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/sports/2020/01/16/nfls-analytics-movement-has-finally-reached-sports-main
stream/ [https://perma.cc/5BL7-RU6X] (describing the rise of analytics in the NFL). See
generally The Great Analytics Rankings, ESPN, https://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/
12331388/the-great-analytics-rankings [https://perma.cc/3HSR-ZER2] (providing a ranking
of analytics programs across the four major American sports leagues).
107. See KEITH LAW, SMART BASEBALL: THE STORY BEHIND THE OLD STATS THAT ARE
RUINING THE GAME, THE NEW ONES THAT ARE RUNNING IT, AND THE RIGHT WAY TO THINK
ABOUT BASEBALL 3 (2017) (describing the resistance of some to the use of analytics within the
baseball establishment).
108. See Matthew Waters, LSR Q+A: Phenix CMO Says Latency Costs Sportsbook Op-
erators Billions in Handle, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (May 20, 2020), https://www.legalsportsreport.
com/40387/phenix-latency-costs-sportsbook-operators/ [https://perma.cc/VSD2-ZTZM] (“Delays
of even a few seconds can make all the difference when betting on a live game, especially
when it comes to prop bets. Imagine watching a football game and you want to place a quick
bet on the coin toss result or whether or not the next play will result in a touchdown. If you’re
watching a stream even five seconds behind broadcast, that means you’ve already lost out on
a window to place that bet. And in turn, sportsbooks have lost out on that revenue. A few sec-
onds is the difference between a bet made and money lost.”).
109. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME
68-96 (2003) (describing the “field of ignorance,” or how Bill James and sabermetrics were able
to elucidate traits in baseball players that may have been missed by the casual observer or
someone relying on traditional measures).
110. See LAW, supra note 107, at 9-11 (noting that batting average, which can be traced
back to Henry Chadwick in the 1800s, is flawed in that it fails in a number of ways to
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wisdom dictated that teams willing to employ the best players by
the measures of the day would, over time, be successful, essentially
relying on the efficient market hypothesis.111 But, like the stock
market, people have spent years looking for inefficiencies.112 Indeed,
this was the crux of Billy Beane’s “Moneyball” plan, believing there
was a way to win using players that conventional wisdom over-
looked.113
In a period with salary caps and luxury taxes, the need to identify
talent within the restrictions of allowable payrolls is heightened,
and being able to identify inefficiencies is critical to success.114 Data
helps provide a visual representation of players’ contributions to a
team.115 The use of analytics in sports with regard to player
performance has continued to evolve since Billy Beane brought
“Moneyball” to the Oakland A’s.116 The modern trends include the
incorporation of wearable technologies and highly advanced camera
equipment that provide proprietary information, which is not
observable by everyone in attendance.117
For example, the NBA began installing SportVu cameras in 2012,
which utilize missile tracking technology to capture spatial data
during NBA games.118 The SportVu system records the locations of
articulate successful batting with adequate specificity).
111. The efficient market hypothesis is the hypothesis that share prices reflect all
information; in the context of athletes, the best players would command the highest prices.
See Lucas Downey, Efficient Market Hypothesis, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.
investopedia.com/terms/e/efficientmarkethypothesis.asp [https://perma.cc/NTJ2-8YEB].
112. See James R. Rogers, Moneyball Illustrates Efficient Markets, Not Behavioral




114. See generally Jared Dubin, Which NBA Player Literally Gives His Team the Most
Value?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 16, 2019, 12:06 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
forget-giannis-pascal-siakam-is-our-mvp/ [https://perma.cc/88SL-DXP7] (using player perfor-
mance measures and salary to rank NBA players).
115. See, e.g., id. (providing an illustration of player contributions).
116. See Rogers, supra note 112.
117. Abhas Ricky, How Data Analysis in Sports Is Changing the Game, FORBES (Jan. 31,
2019, 7:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/01/31/how-data-analysis-
in-sports-is-changing-the-game/ [https://perma.cc/C63U-54WJ].
118. Bryan Bishop, SportVu’s Missile-Tracking Technology Turns Basketball into a Num-
bers Game, VERGE (June 23, 2012, 1:30 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2012/6/23/3112926/
sportvu-missile-tracking-technology-basketball [https://perma.cc/XV9P-Y53R].
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all players, referees, and the ball, twenty-five times per second.119
The technology provided by products like SportVu enables teams to
identify information beyond what is observable to the naked eye,
such as how many rebounds a basketball player should have had
versus the conventional measure, how many rebounds a basketball
player did have.120 While the NBA could have kept this data to
itself, the league has allowed fans to access some of the infor-
mation.121 In addition to using camera-based technology to generate
insights into player performance, there has been a growing reliance
on wearable technology to optimize training schedules for
athletes.122 The proprietary nature of data derived from wearable
technology not only provides teams insight into player fatigue, but
it also makes this data highly desirable to others who rely on
complete information, such as bookmakers.123
B. Scouting
Scouting is an area whereby team employees evaluate the per-
formance of players on other teams, and it has become one of the
most significant aspects in sports, both from the perspective of
evaluating upcoming opponents, and for evaluating future team
members.124 All of the major professional sports rely on data, both
quantitative and qualitative, to make player personnel decisions,
and the ability to find something that others miss can be highly
119. Id.
120. See James Plafke, How the NBA’s SportVU Ball and Player Tracking Tech Changes
the Face of Sports, EXTREME TECH (Oct. 29, 2013, 5:00 PM), https://www.extremetech.com/
extreme/169775-how-the-nbas-sportvu-ball-and-player-tracking-tech-changes-the-face-of-
sports [https://perma.cc/U5TW-5UYD] (describing the uses of SportVu cameras).
121. Troy Wolverton, Big Data Meets Big-Time Basketball, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 12, 2016,
7:40 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2014/05/17/big-data-meets-big-time-basketball/
[https://perma.cc/425J-LPPP].
122. See, e.g., Stephanie Springer, An Update on Wearable Baseball Technology, HARDBALL
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2018), https://tht.fangraphs.com/an-update-on-wearable-technology/ [https://
perma.cc/EBB4-X78T] (describing the adoption of a collectively bargained policy governing
wearables in Major League Baseball).
123. See John T. Holden & Kimberly Houser, Taboo Transactions: Selling Athlete Biometric
Data, 48 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 9), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3793144 [https://perma.cc/JCE3-TGYP].
124. Frank Angst, What Does a Sports Scout Do?, BALANCE CAREERS (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://www.thebalancecareers.com/career-profile-sports-scout-3113310 [https://perma.cc/
5S4M-9MT5].
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valuable.125 Data from scouts is compiled in scouting reports and
then integrated into team decision-making.126 While there has been
an increased shift away from in-person scouting towards data-
driven analyses, most major professional sports still rely on the
observations of people to generate at least some aspects of their
scouting reports.127
Indeed, at least in the case of MLB scouting, the industry has,
perhaps, become a victim of its own success.128 Technological ad-
vancements, like baseball’s TrackMan radar, provide more data
with greater accuracy than a human scout is capable of providing.129
In turn, these data points supply information directly back to team
front offices, where projections on players’ career paths can be
made.130 Reliance on data scientists has created a source of competi-
tion for traditional scouts, which could eventually create a market
where only the very top scouts survive.131 The modern scouting
department is a combination of in-person staff and scientific input
from technologies, like TrackMan; both send information back to the
front office staff, who then make decisions based on the analytic
output.132 Despite the technological threat for traditional scouts,
the information and insight that scouts collect is of significant
value, and there is some evidence that the expert knowledge of a
scout may be a valuable trait in other derivative industries such as
sports betting.133
125. See MOSKOWITZ & WERTHEIM, supra note 29, at 173-91 (discussing how Mike McCoy
and Jerry Jones revolutionized the National Football League draft by reconceptualizing the
value of each draft pick).
126. ALAMAR,supra note 31, at 24-26 (describing the process of integrating scouting reports
into a data analytics program).
127. See Ron Morris, A ‘Concerning’ Future for Traditional MLB Scouting, BASEBALL AM.
(Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.baseballamerica.com/stories/a-concerning-future-for-traditional-
mlb-scouting/ [https://perma.cc/ALS4-JB9D] (noting a decrease in scouting in Major League
Baseball as teams shift towards expanded analytics programs).
128. See Ben Lindbergh, The Evolution of MLB Scouting Is a Threat to the Profession Itself,
RINGER (Mar. 8, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.theringer.com/mlb/2019/3/8/18255453/cincin
nati-reds-scouting-reports-series-part-3 [https://perma.cc/S2L3-N3HF] (describing how as
scouts provide increasing amounts of data to be analyzed, analysts are better able to make




132. ALAMAR, supra note 31, at 91-116.
133. See Mike Fish, ‘Seven or Eight’ Scouts Linked to Gambling Investigation, ESPN (Aug.
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C. Fantasy Sports and Gambling
As valuable as sports information is to players, teams, and sports
leagues, it is likely as valuable—perhaps even more so—to the in-
tertwined fantasy sports and sports gambling industries.134 Success
in both fantasy sports and sports gambling relies on a combination
of skill derived from compiling and analyzing information and
luck.135 The ability to gain access to, and act on, information that is
faster and better than that which fantasy players and gamblers
are competing against can create a significant advantage.136
11, 2008), https://www.espn.com/mlb/news/story?id=3529999 [https://perma.cc/63KX-H4YX]
(describing a gambling ring involving a number of former Major League Baseball scouts).
134. The illegal sports gambling market in the United States has been estimated to see up-
wards of $150 billion wagered annually. See Holden, supra note 56, at 578. Likewise, the
fantasy sports market is estimated to be worth more than $33 billion by 2025. Press Release,
Orbis Research, Fantasy Sports Market Estimated to Grow at 13.2% to Reach $33200 Mn by
2025—Key Insights on Revenue (Value), Potential Application, Economic Fluctuations,
Growth Rate and Future Trends (Aug. 24, 2019, 12:33 AM), https://www.globenewswire.com/
news-release/2019/08/24/1906227/0/en/Fantasy-Sports-Market-Estimated-to-grow-at-13-2-to-
reach-33200-Mn-by-2025-Key-Insights-on-Revenue-Value-Potential-Application-Economic-
Fluctuations-Growth-Rate-and-Future-Trends-Or.html [https://perma.cc/CYP5-53MU]. In con-
trast, the NFL, the most valuable professional sports league in the United States, saw rev-
enue of only $9.5 billion in 2019. Eben Novy-Williams, NFL Shared Revenue Hits Record $9.5
Billion as Media Payouts Rise, SPORTICO (July 21, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://www.sportico.com
/leagues/football/2020/nfl-shared-revenue-2019-billion-packers-1234609285/ [https://perma.
cc/8GG5-WXFX].
135. For a detailed discussion on skill versus chance in daily fantasy sports, see Dylan
Pickering, Alex Blaszczynski, Melanie Hartmann & Brittany Keen, Fantasy Sports: Skill,
Gambling, or Are These Irrelevant Issues?, 3 CURRENT ADDICTION REP. 307, 308-11 (2016); see
also Brief and Special Appendix for the United States at 30, United States v. DiCristina, 726
F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-3720), 2012 WL 6800562, at *30 (“[S]ports betting ... involves
‘substantial (not “slight”) skill’.... Sports bettors can employ superior knowledge of the games,
teams and players in order to exploit odds that do not reflect the true likelihoods of the
possible outcomes.”); Ryan Rodenberg, Documents Show DOJ, NFL Have Argued That Sports
Betting Is Skill-Based, ESPN (July 16, 2015), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/13268
458/documents-show-justice-department-nfl-argued-skill-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/
33FT-Y4N4].
136. See, e.g., Peter Rowe, Billy Walters, Gambler Extraordinaire, CHI. TRIB. (June 13,
2014, 6:17 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/sdut-billy-walters-gambler-extraordinare-
2014jun13-story.html [https://perma.cc/B4K5-9K5X] (noting that legendary sports bettor Billy
Walters would send “members of his gambling syndicate to the airport, where they gleaned
intelligence from travelers’ out-of-town newspapers” and that Walters was also one of the first
to use computers in the pre-personal computer era to calculate odds in order to gain an
advantage on bookmakers).
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1. The Fantasy Sports Industry
The fantasy sports industry has its origins dating back nearly 100
years to the 1920s with the sale of a tabletop game called All-Star
Baseball made by the Ethan Allen furniture company.137 The table-
top game eventually faded in popularity as fantasy sports emerged
from an activity in Professor Bill Gamson’s “Baseball Seminar.”138
Gamson’s seminar was conceived in the spring of 1960, while he
attended graduate school.139 Gamson and two friends spent five
hours bantering back and forth and eventually came up with an
auction system for MLB players using four statistics: batting av-
erage, runs batted in, earned run average, and wins.140 One of the
Baseball Seminar attendees was Robert Sklar, who is credited with
explaining the concept to a mentee of his, Daniel Okrent, who would
go on to conceive of the rules behind Rotisserie baseball—a deri-
vative of the Baseball Seminar.141 Okrent’s game would be named
after the restaurant where he proposed the game’s rules to his
friends, La Rotisserie Francaise.142
The first season of Rotisserie league baseball featured ten par-
ticipants who each paid $260 for participation.143 The Rotisserie
league participants selected an equal number of real-life baseball
players and competed over the course of a Major League Baseball
season along eight statistical categories: four for batting and four
for pitching.144 The winner was the individual whose team of real-
world players scored the highest in the eight statistical categories
and received a cash prize.145 The popularity of Rotisserie baseball
would grow, eventually playing a significant role in launching the
fantasy sports industry that exists today.146 The advent of the in-
ternet was a monumental event for fantasy sports, because it
137. Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the Law: How America
Regulates Its New National Pastime, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 4 (2012).
138. Id. at 5.




142. Edelman, supra note 137, at 6.
143. Id. at 7.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 7-8.
146. Id. at 7-9.
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eliminated one of the biggest obstacles to playing fantasy sports:
the paperwork.147 By the mid-1990s, major sports broadcasting
properties, such as ESPN, launched verticals on their websites
devoted to fantasy sports.148
By around 2010, the fantasy sports industry had grown in value
to more than $5 billion per year.149 But, the fantasy industry would
be changed forever in the years following the launch of daily fantasy
sports as a result of incessant advertising campaigns by the dom-
inant companies in the industry.150 Daily fantasy sports decreased
the length of time required for fantasy sports from the length of
an actual professional sports season to days, or even hours, leading
some to argue daily fantasy sports were fantasy sports on ste-
roids.151
Daily fantasy sports were an accelerant for fantasy sports
participation, and by 2015, more than fifty-seven million people in
North America were playing fantasy sports.152 There is an argument
to be made that daily fantasy sports were treading a fine line be-
tween sports gambling (which was forbidden at the time of their
launch) and fantasy sports.153 The daily fantasy sports industry ar-
gued that because the games were skill-based they were distinct
from gambling laws, which prohibited activities like sports bet-
ting.154 Daily fantasy sports contests, however, were so skill-based
147. Id. at 9-10.
148. Id. at 10.
149. Id. at 11.
150. See Holden & Brandon-Lai, supra note 91, at 1 (during the lead up to the NFL season
in 2015, one of the largest daily fantasy companies was airing a television advertisement
every one-and-a-half minutes).
151. See Christian Rigg, What Are Daily Fantasy Sports?, TECHRADAR (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.techradar.com/news/what-are-daily-fantasy-sports [https://perma.cc/E62A-NX
UR]; Andrew Billings, Brody James Ruihley & Yiyi Yang, Fantasy Gaming on Steroids?
Contrasting Fantasy Sport Participation by Daily Fantasy Sport Participation, 5 COMMC’N &
SPORT 732, 732 (2017).
152. Holden & Brandon-Lai, supra note 91, at 1.
153. Holden et al., supra note 47, at 122-23.
154. See John T. Holden, Will F. Green & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Daily Fantasy, Tipping, and
Wire Fraud, 21 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 8, 9 (2017) (noting that the CEO of FanDuel argued
that daily fantasy games were games of skill). This assertion confuses the issue that despite
being a game of skill, in many states, an activity can still be prohibited as a gambling activity.
See John T. Holden, Trifling and Gambling with Virtual Money, 25 UCLAENT.L.REV. 41, 79-
81 (2018) (describing the various state law tests for ascribing an activity as gambling).
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that one study found that the top eleven daily fantasy participants
accounted for the majority of the winnings.155
Overall, daily fantasy sports changed how fantasy players en-
gaged with statistics and sports data.156 Not only did daily fantasy
sports change fantasy sports from a social activity amongst friends
to an activity that centered around contests with thousands of
strangers, but it also created a market for information beyond box
scores.157 The growth of daily fantasy sports enabled individuals to
make a living on the activity, and that stimulated innovation.158 The
innovation in the daily fantasy sports world has pushed the fantasy
football world in a direction that differentiates it from traditional
fantasy sports.159 Specifically, the fantasy football world looks for
predictive analytics, as opposed to focusing on past performance like
that denoted in box scores.160 This shift in focus, and the huge prize
pools in the daily fantasy sports industry, changed fantasy sports
from an activity driven by sports fans, who enjoyed the minutiae of
a box score, to an activity dominated by a small group of partici-
pants who play more frequently and win much more frequently
because of their superior entry strategies.161
2. The Gambling Industry
While the gambling industry and the fantasy sports industry
share some commonalities, especially in the daily fantasy sports
realm,162 the value of the sports gambling world far exceeds that of
155. Holden et al., supra note 154, at 9.
156. See Hal Koss, How Data Science and Analytics Came to Dominate Fantasy Football,




159. See id. 
160. Id.
161. See Ed Miller & Daniel Singer, For Daily Fantasy Sports Operators, the Curse of Too
Much Skill, SPORTS BUS. J. (July 27, 2015), https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/
Journal/Issues/2015/07/27/Opinion/From-the-Field-of-Fantasy-Sports.aspx [https://
perma.cc/N2KV-7Q9Y] (noting that the top eleven daily fantasy players accounted for 17
percent of all entry fees, and the bottom 85 percent of daily fantasy players effectively only
exist to provide money for the top players to win).
162. See generally John Brennan, Is Daily Fantasy Sports Gambling? IRS Now Says ‘Yes’,
USBETS (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.usbets.com/irs-says-daily-fantasy-sports-gambling/
[https://perma.cc/N2H2-7GP9] (noting that the IRS clarified in 2020 that daily fantasy sports
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the fantasy sports industry.163 The sports gambling industry dates
back centuries to some of the earliest organized sporting competi-
tions.164 While sports betting has always relied on game results to
determine winners and losers, the rise of in-play betting, or wa-
gering while a game is ongoing, has created a demand for faster
data.165 There has been a rise in in-play betting and increases in
demand for high-speed data.166 The practice of getting in-game
updates from bookmakers is not new, and it even served as a mo-
tivation for the 1961 Wire Act,167 which prohibited the interstate
transmission of “information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers.”168
On the surface, bookmaking markets appear to have similarities
to financial markets.169 Unlike in financial markets, which charac-
teristically feature frequent price changes, sports betting markets
feature a bookmaker setting a price and then making infrequent
adjustments based on market demand.170 Similarly, unlike in fi-
nancial markets where the primary task of the market is to match
buyers and sellers, in the traditional bookmaking world, the book-
maker is a market participant; though historical wisdom is that the
contests are within the scope of the federal excise tax on sports wagers).
163. The illegal sports betting market is valued at upwards of $150 billion by some. See
Steve Silverman, Legalized Sports Gambling Passes $10 Billion, Likely Just Tip of the Iceberg,
FORBES (Aug. 29, 2019, 12:39 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevesilverman/2019/08/29/
legalized-sports-gambling-passes-10-billion-likely-just-tip-of-the-iceberg/ [https://perma.cc/
38M9-945E]. Whereas the fantasy sports industry is projected to reach $25 billion by the year
2024. Press Release, MarketWatch, Fantasy Sports Market Is Set to Grow at 13.7% CAGR
Exceeding US$ 25780 Million by 2024 (Mar. 10, 2021, 8:47 AM), https://www.marketwatch.
com/press-release/fantasy-sports-market-is-set-to-grow-at-137-cagr-exceeding-us-25780-mil
lion-by-2024-2021-03-10 [https://perma.cc/8ESY-V7HY].
164. See generally Holden & Edelman, supra note 49, at 910-11 (describing the history of
betting on sports).
165. Brett Smiley, Opinion: The War Over Sports Betting Data: Lies, Half-Truths and
Statistics: Part II, SPORTSHANDLE (Sept. 18, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-
data-war-analysis-part-two/ [https://perma.cc/2TDY-HJRA].
166. See Glanz & Armendariz, supra note 1 (describing the demand for data).
167. Holden, supra note 67, at 698 (noting that during the 1950s, “Western Union provided
a ticker service that furnished inning by inning scores” of baseball games).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).
169. See Steven D. Levitt, Why Are Gambling Markets Organised So Differently from
Financial Markets?, 114 ECON. J. 223, 223 (2004) (noting that there are many similarities
between certain financial markets and sports betting markets, yet they are organized
differently).
170. Id. at 223-24.
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bookmaker would attempt to attract an equal number of wagers on
each side of a proposition and then make their profit on the vigorish
or commission they charged.171 But researcher Steven Levitt found
that bookmakers actually seek to maximize profits, as opposed to
merely seeking to create a balanced book with an equal number of
wagers on each side of a proposition.172
Sportsbooks rely on sports data companies to collect, process,
monitor, and deliver data.173 The sports data provider is in a
precarious long-term position, as a sports league could elect to cut
off their access and deliver the product themselves.174 To date,
however, many leagues still rely on official data provider partners
to deliver sports data to betting operators.175 Sports data companies
provide a variety of services to bookmakers.176 In 2012, upwards of
70 percent of bookmakers used third-party data providers to supply
data and provide odds suggestions.177 The services offered by some
data providers include: “validating bets, aggregating the betting
data of all clients, and updating the odds in real-time based on the
total liabilities of those clients.”178 Sports data companies function-
ally offer many of the necessities to operate a sportsbook, short of a
physical or online storefront.179
Sports leagues rely on official scorers to generate the “official”
results of a game.180 Some sports data companies employ data scouts
who attend games (or watch on a screen) and record the results on
a phone app, transmitting data back to a processing center, which
171. Id. at 224-25.
172. Id. at 225-26.
173. See Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, Karen Elterman & Oliver Gassmann, Sportradar (A):
From Data to Storytelling, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2018, at 1.
174. Id. at 12.
175. See, e.g., id. at 1 (“Moreover, sports leagues might soon decide to eliminate third-party
data feeds such as Sportradar’s, which they used to supplement their proprietary data feeds,
and opt to develop data services as part of their own core businesses.”).
176. See id. at 5.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id. (noting the availability of information on game times and teams involved; pre-
game information; live data; pregame odds; live odds, which are calculated as the game is
being played; statistics; managed risk trading services; and data visualization).
180. See, e.g., Official Scorer, BASEBALL REFERENCE (May 27, 2019, 2:11 PM), https://www.
baseball-reference.com/bullpen/ Official_scorer [https://perma.cc/F8VH-9VRT] (describing the
role of official scorers of Major League Baseball games).
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then relays the information to clients in milliseconds.181 Sports data
companies rely on speed to deliver data as fast as possible to clients
because “[a]fter one second, data had significantly less value for
betting markets, and within a few seconds, the value was diluted to
zero in betting markets.”182 Odds updates that are not delivered at
rapid speed risk allowing bettors to place bets on events that have
already taken place—something that would be incredibly costly for
a bookmaker.183
A dominant player in the sports betting data world has likened
itself to the famed Bloomberg Terminal after announcing that it
controls 90 percent market share in the nascent New Jersey sports
betting market.184 The cost for a data package with live in-game
odds for three hundred games can cost upwards of $4,000 to $6,000
per month, with the cost increasing as customers request live data
for additional games.185 The cost of a data package can be broken
down into à la carte pieces, with 50 percent of the cost attributed to
an XML data feed, a second 25 percent attached to opening betting
line information and updates to pregame betting lines, and the final
quarter attributed to in-game live data feeds.186 Managing this
information in-house could cost a sportsbook seven figures a year in
salaries.187
Beginning at the start of the 2019 NBA season, the league an-
nounced official partnerships between the league and two data
providers that would have the nonexclusive distribution rights to
official league data.188 The partnerships would mean that the dis-
tributors would have access to the league’s official scorekeeping
181. Casadesus-Masanell et al., supra note 173, at 6.
182. Id. This is because if bookmakers do not adjust live odds fast enough after an on-field
event has occurred, bettors in the marketplace could capitalize on a pricing inefficiency. See
generally Simon Cox, Why Tennis ‘Courtsiding’ Was My Dream Job, BBC NEWS (Apr. 20,
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32402945 [https://perma.cc/Y2ER-3NQ8] (describ-
ing the practice of courtsiding).
183. Casadesus-Masanell et al., supra note 173, at 6.
184. Matt Rybaltowski, Here’s How Much ‘Official’ League Data Actually Costs,





188. Id. (noting that the deal included the rights to the WNBA as well).
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data.189 The NBA deal was followed by an announcement of a
similar deal by MLB with one of the major data providers.190 But the
deals were only the beginning. After failed efforts to secure an
integrity fee, which would have mandated that states require book-
makers pay the leagues 1 percent of the amount wagered on a
particular league’s events, the leagues began lobbying for the
implementation of mandates requiring states use official league
data to determine the outcomes of certain types of bets.191 Indeed,
the search for official data mandates could actually serve to un-
dermine the legal betting market, especially if the use of official
league data translates into higher costs, which illegal bookmakers
do not have to pay.192
While leagues could certainly use proprietary technology to gen-
erate unique information that providers could sell to a sportsbook
operator at a premium, the demand for such information remains
speculative.193 The debate over official data mandates has centered
largely on the marketing of official league data as a superior product
to unofficial data, which many of the same data providers sold
previously, and in some instances continue to sell.194 The sports
leagues have advocated that official league data is more accurate
than other sources, though this argument is not supported by strong
evidence.195 Indeed, while fast data may be desirable, its value may
ultimately be trumped by that of accurate data.196 Although the
leagues have publicly argued that official data mandates are
necessary to protect the accuracy of the data, they have privately
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See Holden & Schuster, supra note 8, at 36-39 (describing sports league efforts to
secure integrity fees and official data mandates).
192. See Rybaltowski, supra note 6.
193. See Matt Rybaltowski, Future of Sports Betting Data: What’s Next in 2020?,
SPORTSHANDLE (Mar. 28, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-data-future-2020/
[https://perma.cc/V7K8-AEJB] (describing future trends in sports betting).
194. See Brett Smiley, Opinion: The War over Sports Betting Data: Lies, Half-Truths and
Statistics: Part I, SPORTSHANDLE (July 17, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-
data-war-analysis-part-one/ [https://perma.cc/AY3V-VPCQ]; see also John Holden, What
Gaming in Holland Can Teach the US Sports Betting Market, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (July 18,
2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/34412/holland-gaming-us-sports-betting/ [https://
perma.cc/B9DG-HUP3] (noting that data providers sell both official and unofficial data).
195. Smiley, supra note 194.
196. Smiley, supra note 165.
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negotiated “by bayonet” with state lawmakers over the mandates.197
In fact, after West Virginia passed a bill that did not satisfy MLB,
deputy commissioner Dan Halem was quoted as saying: “Not one of
our issues was taken up, not a single one. If you don’t want to ad-
dress them, then we won’t do business in this state and we’ll
leave.”198 When asked by casino representatives what casinos would
receive in exchange for paying a fee to the leagues, Halem report-
edly said: “Peace. Keeping our commissioner (from) going on TV
saying (the state’s betting market) is corrupt and sorts. You want
that or support that? Pay us.”199 The tactics reportedly employed by
MLB in West Virginia were unsuccessful, however.200 A softer
approach was used with lawmakers from Michigan, who were al-
legedly convinced of the benefits of official data while being swooned
at the world-renowned TPC Sawgrass golf course in Florida.201
The mandates for official data are particularly odious to many in
the betting industry because, for years, the industry has existed on
services that deliver similar products to the official data providers,
but without the endorsement of the leagues.202 The efforts to con-
solidate legislative mandates and then corner the market threaten
to harm the competitiveness of the data market,203 and the integrity
of the market.204 Further, it is even more offensive that leagues
would seek legislative mandates and strong-arm tactics after they
have spent decades failing to successfully assert a property interest
in information resulting from the games they facilitate.205
197. Joe Vardon, How MLB, the NBA and the PGA Used ‘Negotiation by Bayonet’ to Get a




199. Id. (alterations in original).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See id. (describing the Don Best service).
203. John Holden, What Exactly Is ‘Commercially Reasonable’ Pricing for Official League
Data?, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/36742/
commercially-reasonable-official-league-data-sports-betting/ [https://perma.cc/5CHD-7SL6].
204. See John T. Holden, Ghosts in the Machine: How Corrupters Manipulate Games That
Never Happened, 22 GAMING L. REV. 630, 632-33 (2018) (describing how games with only a
single data feed may be easier to corrupt than games where there is a marketplace, because
a marketplace for data should be able to quickly identify events that are mispriced).
205. See generally Rodenberg et al., supra note 102, at 86-96 (describing various historical
efforts by sports leagues to unsuccessfully claim ownership over sports statistics).
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III. THE LACK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
SPORTS DATA
One of the initial narratives in the nascent legal sports betting
environment has been from sports league executives claiming that
they have a property right in the information generated from
sporting events.206 Indeed, both the commissioner of MLB and the
commissioner of the NBA referred to the use of the leagues’
“intellectual property” as part of their justification for demanding
royalty payments from sportsbook operators.207 While sports leagues
own an abundance of intellectual property rights, the information
used by bookmakers does not immediately appear to be amongst
those for which leagues can demand compensation.208 Data gener-
ated from sporting events can be broken down into two categories
for purposes of an intellectual property examination: first, pure
game data; and second, data that has already been collected and
aggregated, also known as “refined data.”209 This Part will explore
these two categories of data in turn.
A. Pure Game Data
The professional sports league executives who have asserted an
intellectual property interest in the information used by bookmak-
ers have often been vague in describing exactly which intellectual
206. John Holden, Making Sense of Pro Sports Leagues’ Search for Sports Betting Data
Fees, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 19, 2018), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/21245/search-for-
sports-betting-fees/ [https://perma.cc/5NYC-MRYA].
207. Id. (quoting MLB commissioner Rob Manfred: “We think that the integrity fee—a
negotiable number somewhere below one percent at this point—is an appropriate recognition
of the fact that the gambling industry is riding our intellectual property, our content, and is
presenting a threat to our competition from an integrity perspective so that we’re going to
have to spend money to prevent that threat from becoming a reality.” NBA commissioner
Adam Silver also weighed in, stating, “the 1% [integrity fee] came directly from other
jurisdictions outside the United States that used that very fee as the model for how leagues
or content creators should be compensated for the use of their intellectual property.”).
208. Id.
209. See generally Aaron Feld, Note, Gambling on Sports Data: Protecting Leagues’ High-
Level Data from Sportsbooks, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 341, 362-68 (describing the differences in
treatment between raw, which we term pure, and refined, which we call already collected and
aggregated, data).
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property right they are seeking to assert.210 Federal law recognizes
three broad categories of intellectual property,211 in addition to
certain qualifying trade secrets.212
1. Patents 
Patents are a property right granted by the federal government
to a patent holder for a period of twenty years.213 Patents are avail-
able in three varieties: utility patents, plant patents, and design
patents.214 The constitutional foundation for patents is found in
Article I, under the so-called “Intellectual Property Clause” of the
Constitution, which establishes congressional power to grant pro-
tections to authors and inventors.215 A search of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office website, however, revealed that none
of the professional sports leagues possess any patent rights related
to sports gambling.216 Indeed, while the sports leagues possess a
number of patents relating to things like helmet design and replay
technology,217 and patents have been granted for certain types of fit-
ness training and golf swings,218 patents related to pure game data
in the sports gambling realm are unlikely to be the source of
intellectual property claims.
2. Trademarks
Trademarks provide protection for entities’ brand identifiers219
because they protect things like a name, symbol, word, or device.220
Many sports trademarks are quite famous, from symbols such as the
Jerry West NBA logo,221 to the Dallas Cowboys’ star.222 Indeed, the
210. Edelman, supra note 10, at 3.
211. Id.
212. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1).
213. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
214. Id. §§ 101, 161, 171.
215. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
216. Edelman, supra note 10, at 4-5.
217. Id.
218. Holden, supra note 206.
219. Edelman, supra note 10, at 7.
220. Holden, supra note 206.
221. NBA, Registration No. 5,529,487.
222. Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark. The mark consists of a star with a
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professional sports leagues sought to gain congressional protection
from state lotteries using trademarks and service marks belonging
to the leagues and their members as far back as 1990.223 Trademark
infringement occurs under the Lanham Act, when “a person uses (1)
any reproduction ... of a mark; (2) without the registrant’s consent;
(3) in commerce; (4) in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution or advertising of any goods; (5) where such use is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive.”224 There are
limits on the commercial use of sports league trademarks by
gambling providers.225 For example, a sportsbook operator would not
be able to imply an endorsement by a sports league by using league
trademarks, but the use of a sports team name to denote a team
that is the subject of a bet is likely a protected use.226 As far back as
1977, the NFL argued that a lottery that offered a wager and used
city names to denote the two teams playing in the game violated
trademark law.227 In fact, as the Delaware District Court explained:
Undoubtedly when defendants print “Philadelphia v. Los An-
geles”, the public reads “Philadelphia Eagles v. Los Angeles
Rams”, and, in this sense, the words utilized by defendants have
a secondary meaning. But I do not understand this fact alone to
constitute infringement of plaintiffs’ registered marks or unfair
competition. Defendants may truthfully tell the public what
service they perform, just as a specialist in the repair of Volks-
wagen cars may tell the public of his specialty by using the word
“Volkswagen”, and just as the manufacturer of a razor blade
may advertise the brand names of the razors they will fit. The
same rule prevails in the area of comparative advertising which
utilizes the tradenames of competing products.228
border design. Registration No. 3,097,072.
223. See Legislation Prohibiting State Lotteries from Misappropriating Professional Sports
Service Marks: Hearing on S. 1772 Before the Subcomm. on Pats., Copyrights & Trademarks
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 1-2 (1990).
224. Edelman, supra note 10, at 8 (quoting Bos. Pro. Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Mfg. Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1009-10 (5th Cir. 1975)).
225. See id. at 9-10.
226. See id.
227. Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Del. 1977).
228. Id. at 1380 (footnotes omitted).
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Indeed, the mere use of team names is unlikely to rise to the level
necessary to satisfy the burden of trademark infringement, and this
use may also fall within the safe harbor of normative fair use.229
3. Copyright
When sports league executives cite intellectual property rights for
which they seek compensation, it is most likely that they are
arguing they have a copyrightable interest in the results of the
sporting events their leagues facilitate.230 The challenge for the
sports leagues in arguing that information used by bookmakers is
protected by copyright is that bookmakers have historically relied
on information that exists as facts in the public domain.231 While
compilations of material may be protectable by copyright, facts on
their own are not.232 Despite this apparent obstacle, the sports
leagues have attempted, on numerous occasions, to circumvent the
fact that they do not have copyright protection in information
generated from sporting events, such as scores.233 In fact, the
Solicitor General has argued that there is no protectable copyright
interest in a live sporting event, though the broadcast may be
copyrighted.234 The sports leagues themselves have seen various
defeats in federal courts across the country as they tried to establish
a property right in information arising from games.235
For example, in 1997, the NBA failed to secure protection under
the Copyright Act after alleging that a service run by Motorola,
229. See Edelman, supra note 10, at 9-10.
230. See generally Holden, supra note 9 (highlighting previous efforts by the sports leagues
to claim ownership over information derived from the games they facilitate).
231. Holden, supra note 9; Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d
Cir. 1997) (“In our view, the underlying basketball games do not fall within the subject matter
of federal copyright protection because they do not constitute ‘original works of authorship’
under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).”); C.B.C. Distrib. Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced
Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he information used in CBC’s fantasy
baseball games is all readily available in the public domain, and it would be strange law that
a person would not have a first amendment right to use information that is available to
everyone.”).
232. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
233. See Holden, supra note 9.
234. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 26, Am. Broad.
Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431 (2014) (No. 13-461).
235. See Holden, supra note 9.
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which sent sports scores to subscribers’ pagers, infringed on league
intellectual property rights.236 The Second Circuit held that ath-
letic events were not copyrightable and that the reproduction of
facts from a broadcast did not infringe on the league’s copyright in
the broadcast of the game itself.237 Other cases pressed by sports
leagues have similarly sought to assert intellectual property rights
to sports data, but they have similarly failed to yield a positive re-
sult for the sports leagues.238 In fact, one of the leagues’ own official
data partners sent a tweet in 2018, quoting an expert stating:
“[t]here is no intellectual property in #sportsdata....”239
4. Trade Secrets
The final category of federal statutory protection that the sports
leagues may use to claim protection of raw game data is trade
secrets.240 The World Intellectual Property Organization notes that
to qualify as a trade secret, the information must be: commer-
cially valuable because it is secret, be known only to a limited
group of persons, and be subject to reasonable steps taken by the
rightful holder of the information to keep it secret, including the
use of confidentiality agreements for business partners and
employees.241
But, while there is a possibility that certain types of compilations of
data sold by sports leagues are protectable under trade secrets
legislation, easily replicable information that is not secret by virtue
of it occurring as part of a public sporting event is unlikely to
qualify for protection.242
236. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 844 (2d Cir. 1997).
237. Id. at 846-47.
238. Holden, supra note 9.
239. John Holden, Is Sportradar Taking a Wrecking Ball to League Arguments on
Intellectual Property in Sports Data?, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.legal
sportsreport.com/22756/sportradar-intellectual-property/ [https://perma.cc/ AU9N-CB4A].
240. See Holden, supra note 206.
241. Trade Secrets, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/tradesecrets/en/
[https://perma.cc/HE4E-BNY8].
242. See id.; Nathaniel Grow, Free Agency for the Front Office: How Data Analytics and
Noncompete Agreements Threaten to Disrupt Competitive Balance in U.S. Professional Sports
Leagues, 58 AM. BUS. L.J. 121, 136 (2021) (“[T]o qualify for trade secret protection, a U.S.
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5. Common Law Property Rights
Despite the apparent absence of statutory rights in general
sporting event information, there are also additional common law
property rights that the sports leagues may employ as a shield
against bookmakers looking to use information from sporting
events.243 To date, the sports leagues have been unsuccessful in
asserting both of these common law rights in their efforts to control
the use of information generated by sporting events.244
a. The Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is a state law claim that is designed to
protect a person’s image from being used by another for commercial
benefit without consent.245 Approximately half the states recognize
the right of publicity, with some classifying the right under a right
to privacy.246 The right of publicity, however, must be balanced
against other interests such as the First Amendment.247 In fact, the
First Amendment was fatal to the argument of Major League Base-
ball Advanced Media, the licensing arm of MLB and the league’s
players association, in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.248 In
C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball
Advanced Media, L.P., it was undisputed that following the expi-
ration of a licensing agreement, C.B.C. continued to use the names
of baseball players and their statistics as part of their fantasy sports
contests.249 While this act would appear to violate the Missouri right
professional sports team must show that it has employed sufficient measures to maintain the
secrecy of its information.”).
243. See Edelman, supra note 10, at 10-14 (describing misappropriation and the right of
publicity).
244. See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997) (de-
scribing why Motorola’s actions did not satisfy the requirements of the doctrine of mis-
appropriation); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the appellant’s First Amendment rights
“supersede” the right of publicity).
245. See Edelman, supra note 10, at 10.
246. Publicity, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/publicity
[https://perma.cc/WPX6-8HWY].
247. See Edelman, supra note 10, at 10-11.
248. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 505 F.3d at 824.
249. Id. at 822.
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of publicity, C.B.C. successfully argued that the First Amendment
“trumps the right-of-publicity.”250 In finding for C.B.C., the Eighth
Circuit noted that “[c]ourts have also recognized the public value of
information about the game of baseball and its players, referring to
baseball as ‘the national pastime.’”251 Courts around the country
have rejected efforts by sports leagues to use the right of publicity
to restrict fantasy sports and sports trading card related products.252
b. Misappropriation
A second common law right that sports leagues have sought to
claim is a right that has its origins in the 1918 case of International
News Service v. Associated Press—“hot news misappropriation.”253
The doctrine of “hot news” misappropriation is a common law
doctrine that is designed to protect commercial sellers of informa-
tion from being victimized by free-riders.254 A “hot news” claim has
five elements:
(i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii) the
information is time-sensitive; (iii) a defendant’s use of the
information constitutes free riding on the plaintiff ’s efforts; (iv)
the defendant is in direct competition with a product or service
offered by the plaintiffs; and (v) the ability of other parties to
free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff or others would so reduce
the incentive to produce the product or service that its existence
or quality would be substantially threatened.255
Historically, the challenge for sports leagues has been two-fold.
First, like in Motorola, the issue has not been that others are free-
riding, but instead that people are independently keeping score and
disseminating that information on their own, which defeats the
250. Id. at 823.
251. Id. (citing Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th
Cir. 1996)).
252. See Edelman, supra note 10, at 11; Cardtoons L.C., 95 F.3d at 969 (holding that
parody trading cards that use the likenesses of baseball players are protected by the First
Amendment).
253. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
254. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997).
255. Id.
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third element of the test.256 Second, the sports leagues were not
competitors with companies like Motorola.257 Indeed they still do not
directly appear to provide data, with the exception of the NFL,
which has an equity stake in one of the providers to sportsbook
operators.258
The two common law rights appear to provide little support for
the leagues’ claims that they have intellectual property rights in the
raw game data. However, in several states, the leagues have lobbied
successfully for official data mandates requiring sports betting
operators to use official league data for certain types of wagers.259
c. New Property Rights Derived from State Gambling
Statutes
While sports leagues have sought to assert a property interest in
information surrounding the games that they facilitate, dating back
to at least the 1970s, they have largely been unsuccessful.260 The
leagues began seeking to obtain a quasi-property right in sports
betting data even before the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n.261 The sports leagues initially
began lobbying for a flat fee, dubbed an “integrity fee,” arguing that
the money was needed to address integrity related concerns,262 but
after receiving little support, the leagues pivoted to seeking to
impose mandates for the use of official data.263 The first appearance
of the sports leagues’ request for a mandate for official league data
was in early 2018.264 The sports leagues began by lobbying in
256. See id. 
257. See id.
258. Rodenberg et al., supra note 102, at 99 n.147.
259. See Becky Harris, Federal Interference with State and Tribal Sports Betting Reg-
ulations Will Not Work: Where the Sports Wagering Integrity Act of 2018 Went Wrong and How
Federal Legislation Might Be Effective, 30 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 106, 126-27 (2020) (de-
scribing adopted and proposed official data mandates).
260. See, e.g., Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (D. Del.
1977).
261. Harris, supra note 259, at 126; 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484-85 (2018).
262. Daniel J. Spitz & Ryan P. Terry, We Can Handle It: Advocating in Support of State
Legislation of Legal Sports Gambling Post-Murphy v. NCAA, 30 J.LEGAL ASPECTSSPORT 153,
160-61 (2020).
263. Holden & Schuster, supra note 8, at 40.
264. Harris, supra note 259, at 126.
2021] MONOPOLIZING SPORTS DATA 109
Connecticut, followed by Kansas, but neither state passed a sports
betting bill.265 By June of 2018, the Murphy decision had been
issued and the sports leagues began lobbying for official data
mandates in Pennsylvania, an effort which was also rebuked.266
Perhaps feeling like state-level lobbying would leave the leagues
without a mandate for the use of official data, and potentially seeing
a possibility of walking away from the nascent sports gambling
market with nothing, the sports leagues turned their attention to
Congress, where Senators Chuck Schumer and Orrin Hatch in-
cluded an official data mandate in proposed legislation.267 But, the
bill introduced at the end of the 115th Congress would die without
a vote.268
The leagues would eventually turn their attention back to state-
level lobbying to secure an official data mandate in several states,
including Tennessee, Illinois, Michigan, and Virginia.269 The man-
dates all have some variance, but they all effectively require that
providers use league-approved data for determining the outcomes
of wagers that occur after a game has begun; in other words, in-play
wagering must utilize official league data.270 While official data
mandates provide a quasi-property interest to sports leagues, their
efficacy—both in practical terms regarding promoting honest sports
betting results, and legally, in regards to various questions about
whether states can mandate that commercial providers use a
certain source of information—remains to be seen.271
B. Already Collected and Aggregated Data
The scope of the data that was found lacking protection in the
cases that have previously addressed intellectual property rights
265. Id. at 126-27.
266. Id. at 127.
267. Id.; Holden & Schuster, supra note 8, at 41.
268. Holden & Schuster, supra note 8, at 41-42.
269. Harris, supra note 259, at 129-30.
270. See id. at 130-32 (describing the subtleties of the various official data mandates).
271. Indeed, one of the concerns that leagues may face in enforcing data mandates is the
First Amendment and whether this mandate is effectively a commercial speech restriction
without sufficient justification; it appears as though by mandating data from certain sources,
the government is privileging a specific version of facts. See Holden & Schuster, supra note
8, at 55-58.
110 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:069
centered on raw data.272 In contrast to raw data, which has several
decades of precedent addressing ownership, sports leagues have also
begun investing heavily in technology that generates, collects,
refines, and aggregates data.273 MLB uses a Statcast system
tracking technology that provides information such as the launch
angle of a batted ball, exit velocity of a ball off a bat, and the spin
rate of a pitcher’s pitches.274 Similarly, the NBA uses the SportVu
camera system, which maps player and ball movements multiple
times per second.275 Additionally, sports leagues have become
increasingly reliant on proprietary algorithms.276 The data collected
by proprietary systems is indeed distinct from the raw data that
could be observed by any attendee at a game and thus requires a
separate examination.277
Data that is produced from other information is called derived
data.278 Derived data differs from raw data and changes the analysis
of an application of federal law, particularly with respect to the
application of the Copyright Act, which provides protections for
compilations of work.279 So, while the factual information observable
to the naked eye is not protectable, the compilation generated by the
use of the technology may be copyrightable.280 There is a possible
challenge to the ability to copyright derived data that is generated
by algorithms as it may not satisfy the Copyright Office’s standards,
which protect only works by humans and specifically exclude
technical methods, formulas, and algorithms.281
272. Feld, supra note 209, at 368.
273. Id.; see also Ryan M. Rodenberg, Antitrust Standing After Apple v. Pepper: Application
to the Sports Betting Data Market, 64 ANTITRUST BULL. 584, 588 (2019) (discussing
proprietary and nonproprietary data).
274. Feld, supra note 209, at 369.
275. See Zach Lowe, Seven Ways the NBA’s New Camera System Can Change the Future
of Basketball, GRANTLAND (Sept. 4, 2013), https://grantland.com/the-triangle/seven-ways-the-
nbas-new-camera-system-can-change-the-future-of-basketball/ [https://perma.cc/L7CZ-BS6K]
(describing the implementation of the SportVu camera system in all NBA arenas).
276. Grow, supra note 242, at 125-26 (describing the growth and reliance on analytics in
professional sports front offices).
277. Feld, supra note 209, at 369.
278. Holden & Houser, supra note 123 (manuscript at 14-15).
279. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see Holden & Houser, supra note 123 (manuscript at 49).
280. Holden & Houser, supra note 123 (manuscript at 49).
281. Id. (manuscript at 49-50) (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 31: IDEAS,
METHODS, OR SYSTEMS (2012)).
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While copyrighting the compilations may be dependent on how
the Copyright Office views the data, whether made by a human or
generated by an algorithm,282 there may be an alternative claim to
protectability via patent.283 Even though some have been skeptical
of the decision of the Patent Office to grant the patent,284 it appears
as though this could be a viable means of protecting information
capable of only being generated by patented machines.285 However,
while this may protect the collection of the information, it would
appear that once that information is made available, either via
broadcast or publication, the information generated would become
a fact incapable of protection by copyright, potentially defeating
some of the value for having a patented process of collecting
information in the first place.286 There is also the potential that a
league could claim that the methodology for generating a point of
derived data is a trade secret.287 This argument becomes strained in
practice, however, as a result of varying groups gathering informa-
tion independently.288 This concern is, however, muted in cases
where equipment needs to be installed on private property to collect
data.289
While none of the new official data mandates include specific
reference to derived data products, some leagues have begun in-
cluding them with the packages sold by data providers.290 The
inclusion of proprietary data, as well as that which is freely
282. Id.
283. See, e.g., Baseball Pitch Quality Determination Method & Apparatus, U.S. Patent No.
10,737,167 (issued Aug. 11, 2020) (describing a patent issued for “[a] system for automatically
determining a pitch rating for a pitch in baseball, the pitch rating indicative of a quality of the
pitch”).
284. Eno Sarris, ‘You Can’t Own an Idea’: Attempt to Patent a Baseball Stat Surprises
Community, ATHLETIC (Sept. 22, 2020), https://theathletic.com/2074516/2020/09/22/you-cant-
own-an-idea-attempt-to-patent-a-baseball-stat-surprises-community/ [https://perma.cc/8MFD-
45UJ].
285. See, e.g., ’167 Patent.
286. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991) (“The first is
that facts are not copyrightable; the other, that compilations of facts generally are.”).
287. See Holden & Houser, supra note 123 (manuscript at 52-54).
288. Id. (manuscript at 53-54).
289. See id.
290. See Brett Smiley, MLB, Sportradar Ink Sports Betting Data Deal as Controversy
Brews, SPORTSHANDLE (Feb. 27, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/mlb-sportradar-announce-
betting-data-deal/ [https://perma.cc/XB9Q-44EE] (noting that MLB’s deal with a data provider
includes Statcast data).
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accessible, is likely a means of hoping to create a market around
these proprietary products.291 The challenge for the marketplace is
that the sports leagues are consolidating the market for data around
only a handful of companies, and given that gambling operators
operate in multiple jurisdictions, the legislative limitations of state
borders have a ripple effect of stifling the marketplace by freezing
out new entrants.292
IV. ANTICOMPETITIVE RISKS OF LEAGUE-WIDE SPORTS DATA
LICENSING AGREEMENTS
To the extent that professional sports teams do not have an ex-
clusive right to collect their own sports data, one would reasonably
expect there to be a free and robust market for collecting, aggregat-
ing, and selling (or licensing) sports data to third parties.293
However, for the most part, there has not emerged a free market for
securing rights to use most forms of sports data.294 To the contrary,
the market for acquiring sports data has come to more closely re-
semble a seller’s monopoly, in which each league’s central office is
the only source where third parties can reasonably turn to acquire
data related to that particular sport.295 In certain circumstances, for
example, with respect to obtaining players’ biometric data, the
teams within a sports league, if not infringing on player privacy
rights, have gained a monopoly through exclusive access to informa-
tion.296 In other circumstances, sports leagues may have faster or
291. Id.
292. See Rybaltowski, supra note 6 (noting that there are effectively four companies that
handle supplying sports data to gambling operators).
293. See generally Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853-54 (2d Cir.
1997) (discussing the competition for the collection and providing of NBA game data between
Gamestats, a company owned by the NBA teams, and STATS, a company that serviced
America Online and Motorola’s SportsTrax paging device).
294. See Official League Data, LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/
official-league-data/ [https://perma.cc/3YS9-2XG5] (discussing the efforts by U.S. professional
sports leagues to pressure or force teams to use what they call “official data,” which is
collected and provided by just a few companies with a direct relationship to the sports
leagues).
295. See id.
296. See Ryan Chiavetta, Biometric Monitors Bring Fresh Privacy Concerns to Pro Sports,
IAPP (Mar. 8, 2017), https://iapp.org/news/a/biometric-monitors-bring-fresh-privacy-concerns-
to-pro-sports/ [https://perma.cc/H97H-F7TB] (discussing MLB’s 2017 approval of players using
wearable technology to collect biometric data during games, but leaving open the question as
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otherwise superior methods for aggregating publicly collectable
data.297 Meanwhile, in yet still other circumstances, sports leagues
may have successfully incentivized the largest sportsbooks to use
exclusively their data (thus driving potential competitors from the
marketplace) or have successfully lobbied state governments to
mandate gambling companies exclusively use their data.298 Under
each of these circumstances, similar, albeit perhaps not identical,
questions emerge as to whether the league’s control over such data
yields significant anticompetitive effects such to give rise to scrutiny
under federal antitrust laws.299
Among the many arguably anticompetitive components of sports
leagues’ emerging data policies are efforts by at least some sports
leagues to require individual teams to sell data exclusively on the
league level, rather than on the team level.300 This practice of col-
lectivizing the ownership and sale rights of sports data gives rise to
important legal questions under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
which courts sometimes describe as “the Magna Carta of free en-
terprise.”301
In pertinent part, section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]v-
ery contract, combination ... or conspiracy[ ] in restraint of trade or
to who owns that data between the player and his team); see also Jacob Feldman, Data
Monetization Trend to Bring Revenue in 2021, Deloitte Says, SPORTICO (Dec. 7, 2020, 9:01 PM),
https://www.sportico.com/business/tech/2020/sports-data-value-covid-deloitte-1234617870/
[https://perma.cc/DJV8-B8SK] (discussing new potential ways for sports leagues to monetize
players’ biometric data, especially in the context of emerging sports gambling markets).
297. Matt Rybaltowski, Document Shows MLB Pitch for Sportsbooks to Become ‘Official
League Data Licensee’, SPORTSHANDLE (June 13, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/mlb-autho
rized-gaming-operator-program/ [https://perma.cc/L98W-3RYC] (discussing a pamphlet cre-
ated by MLB, trying to encourage sportsbooks to purchase their data for use in prop bets,
based on the League’s claim that their data is superior because it is collected more rapidly,
thus reducing lag time).
298. See Beatrice Lucas, Comment, All Bets Are Off: Preempting Major League Baseball’s
Monopoly on Sports Betting Data, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1537, 1538 (2020) (explaining, in
particular, that two states, Illinois and Tennessee, have passed requirements mandating that
gambling operators exclusively use official league data).
299. See Edelman, supra note 11; see also Ryan M. Rodenberg, Regulating Sports Gaming
Data, 11 UNLVGAMING L.J. 9, 35-41 (2020) (noting antitrust issues in the data marketplace).
300. See, e.g., Gregory J. Pelnar, The Antitrust Perils of Sports Data for U.S. Sports
Leagues, ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2020, at 28, 31 (“Sports leagues that have collectivized the
ownership and sale of sports data at the league level ... may be accused of a conspiracy in the
restraint of trade ... in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”).
301. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
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commerce ... is declared to be illegal.”302 Read literally, this section
of antitrust law would seem to disallow all business contracts, as all
contracts technically entail at least some degree of “restraint.”303 In
practice, however, most courts have adopted an interpretation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act that only invalidates those contracts
that “unreasonably” restrain trade.304 The process by which a court
would review an antitrust challenge under section 1 of the Sherman
Act is rather straightforward, and typically entails applying a three-
step process.305 First, a reviewing court would determine whether
there exists “concerted action between at least two legally distinct
economic entities,” as is necessary to bring an action under the
scope of section 1.306 Then, the court would assess if the underlying
conduct “does more to harm than to help competition in the specific
market or markets of inquiry.”307 Finally, the court would need to
consider if there is a broader statute or matter of public policy that
would override the traditional application of antitrust law.308
302. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
303. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98
(1984).
304. See id. (“[T]he Sherman Act was intended to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of
trade.”).
305. Marc Edelman, The NCAA, Fair Pay to Play, Antitrust Scrutiny, and the Need for
Institutional Reform, 20 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. 177, 186 (2020).
306. Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2000); see
also Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 186 (2010) (“The question
whether an arrangement is a contract, combination, or conspiracy is different from and
antecedent to the question whether it unreasonably restrains trade.”).
307. Edelman, supra note 305, at 186-87.
308. Id. at 187. Implicit within this analysis is also the threshold requirement that the
underlying restraint affects interstate commerce, as is required to create the judicial hook for
Congress to appropriately regulate commerce; however, in the context of a purported restraint
implemented in a United States professional sports league, it is hard to argue that either the
“interstate” or the “commerce” component of the requirement would prove to be a source of
meaningful debate. See Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In
order to establish a claim under Section 1 [of the Sherman Act], a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that there was a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) that the agreement unreasonably
restrained trade under either a per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis; and (3)
that the restraint affected interstate commerce.” (emphasis added) (quoting Hairston v. Pac.
10 Conf., 101 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996))); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-83
(1972) (acknowledging that professional sports leagues engaged in activities that affect
interstate commerce and, outside of perhaps MLB, are subject to federal antitrust laws); Marc
Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different from Illegal Group Boycotts,
58 CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 642 (2009) (“There is no real dispute about whether the NFL
Personal Conduct Policy has an effect on trade or commerce among more than one state.”).
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Section A of this Part explores why league-wide policies related
to collectivizing the ownership and sale of sports data would likely
constitute “concerted action” under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Section B then analyzes the potential competitive effects of a sports
league’s collective selling or licensing the rights to use league data.
Finally, Section C explores any mitigating factors that, as a matter
of public policy, may override general antitrust concerns related to
the centralized sale of sports data.
A. Concerted Action
Unlike other sections of antitrust law, section 1 of the Sherman
Act “applies only to concerted action” between multiple entities.309
In this vein, the law recognizes that certain acts that may be harm-
less when performed by a single entity acting alone “may become a
public wrong when done by many acting in concert” if the result is
harmful “to the public or to the individual against whom the con-
certed action is directed.”310 To determine whether an alleged
restraint of trade involves “concerted action between two legally
distinct economic entities,” a court will typically consider “whether
there is evidence of an agreement, either written or implied, be-
tween entities that lack a common objective.”311 This determination
compels a plaintiff to show the presence of an agreement that “‘de-
prives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking’ ...
and thus of actual or potential competition.”312
The Supreme Court’s unanimous 2010 decision in American
Needle provides the important guideposts for ascertaining whether
a centralized decision by a professional sports league constitutes
“concerted action” under federal antitrust law. The Court found that
the collectivized licensing of NFL team marks for use on para-
phernalia constituted “concerted action.”313 The Court explained
that “[d]ecisions by NFL teams to license their separately owned
309. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 190.
310. E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914).
311. Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why the NCAA’s
No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 61, 72 (2013)
(quoting Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2000)).
312. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 195 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752, 769 (1984)).
313. Id. at 186.
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trademarks collectively and to only one vendor [would] ‘depriv[e] the
marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking,’ ... and
therefore of actual or potential competition.”314 The Court further
explained that “[a]lthough NFL teams have common interests such
as promoting the NFL brand, they are still separate, profit-maxi-
mizing entities, and their interests in licensing team trademarks
are not necessarily [fully] aligned.”315
The Supreme Court’s holding in American Needle does not nec-
essarily apply to every theoretical model for operating a professional
sports league.316 For example, one could make a reasonable argu-
ment that there would not be “concerted action” if a sports league
such as the XFL, a startup American football league that was fully
owned by the publicly traded World Wrestling Entertainment Inc.,
were to sell its data through a central league office.317 The reason
being, this action would not constitute the joining of otherwise
separate centers of decision-making.318 Nevertheless, the holding in
American Needle still strongly supports the conclusion that when
traditionally structured sports leagues (e.g., MLB, the NBA, the
NFL, the NHL, and probably even Major League Soccer) centralize
data rights, the threshold requirement of “concerted action” is
almost certainly met.319
314. Id. at 197 (alteration in original) (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769).
315. Id. at 198.
316. See id. at 191 (explaining that in determining whether there is concerted action for
purposes of an antitrust analysis, courts have “eschewed such formalistic distinctions in favor
of a functional consideration of how the parties involved in the alleged anticompetitive
conduct actually operate[d]”).
317. See Marc Edelman, Why the ‘Single Entity’ Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs:
A Primer on Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.PROP.,MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 891, 902-03 (2008) (describing the original XFL, which folded after the 2000-01
season as a “pure common-property system” that would fall under the scope of a “single
entity” in the antitrust sense because the entirety of the league was owned in majority stake
by a single, publicly traded company: WWE); Michael McCann, Advantages and Drawbacks
to XFL Operating as a Single-Entity Sports League, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.si.com/nfl/2018/01/26/xfl-single-entity-sports-leagues-advantages-drawbacks
[https://perma.cc/SRK9-Z48H] (explaining how the second iteration of the XFL was structured
in much the same way, arguably for the purposes of avoiding potential antitrust liability).
318. See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 194-95 (discussing the separate centers of decision-making
test).
319. See id. at 186 (finding that the NFL’s league-wide licensing activities constitute con-
certed behavior); see also Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 2002)
(finding that despite Major League Soccer’s single corporate structure, which distinguished
it from MLB, the NBA, the NFL, and the NHL, the economic realities of the operations of
2021] MONOPOLIZING SPORTS DATA 117
If there is any room whatsoever for debate about whether a sports
league’s attempts to centralize the rights to data constitute “con-
certed action,” that debate would likely stem from questions about
whether in-game data from a particular sporting event is non-
property, individual team property, shared property between the
two teams who play in a game, or even perhaps the players’
property.320 This question is complicated both by the fact that sports
statistics from a given contest would not exist unless there were two
separate teams playing against one another,321 and that there is no
public database in which individuals or entities can file claims of
ownership over game data, such as what exists for trademark
rights.322 Nevertheless, this complex and theoretical question is
largely tangential to the “concerted action” analysis because if no
team were to own underlying sports data, it would not be able to
license it to others.323 And, even if one were to deem in-game data to
be property of both teams playing in a game, still the joining of
individual game data from multiple games, each involving different
teams, would be “concerted” in nature.324
B. Competitive Effects Analysis
Recognizing that the league-wide sale of sports data, at least
under traditionally structured sports leagues, almost certainly con-
stitutes “concerted action,”325 the antitrust inquiry of collectivizing
the ownership of sports data next shifts to assessing the competitive
Major League Soccer made single-entity treatment of the league “doubtful”).
320. See Danielle Boyd, The Great Debate: Athlete Data—Who Owns It?, SPORTS TECH.GRP.
(Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.sportstechgroup.co/sports-tech-education/athlete-data [https://
perma.cc/FX5Z-R8SN] (focusing primarily on the question of who owns data derived from
wearable technologies—players or teams?).
321. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 278
(1978) (pointing out an arguable paradox existing in itself in terms of analyzing professional
sports leagues under traditional legal frameworks because two teams are needed for a game
to be played).
322. See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297-98 (2019) (noting that“Under the Lanham
Act, the [Patent and Trademark Office] administers a federal registration system for trade-
marks,” which provides prima facie evidence of who has ownership rights in a given mark).
323. See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d
818, 825 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing the importance of a contractual right of ownership in data
because one cannot license rights that one does not first legally possess).
324. See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 191-92 (explaining what constitutes “concerted action”).
325. See id. at 198.
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effects emanating from the agreement among individual teams in
a sports league to collectively license the use of their aggregated
data.326 This Article assesses the competitive effects of league data
policies in three steps: first, by explaining the general standard of
reviewing such restraints; second, by exploring existing case law
that relates to somewhat analogous restraints; and third, by ex-
ploring the likely economic effects of sports leagues collectivizing the
ownership and sale of sports data.
1. General Standards of Review
There are a number of different standards by which a court can
assess collective action under antitrust law, including, for example,
the per se test, the full Rule of Reason test, and the quick-look Rule
of Reason test.327 Because professional sports leagues are typically
recognized as legitimate joint ventures that serve at least certain,
benevolent purposes (such as setting league rules and scheduling
games),328 it is almost a certainty that a court would review the
practice of sports leagues collectivizing the ownership and sale of
sports data under a full Rule of Reason inquiry.329 Applying a full
Rule of Reason analysis rather than any judicial shortcut, the
legality of a sports league’s collectivizing of the ownership and sale
of sports data would likely turn on careful analysis of factors,
including: the collective market power of teams within a given
326. Edelman, supra note 305, at 186-87 (referencing competitive effects analysis as the
second stage in an antitrust inquiry under § 1 of the Sherman Act).
327. See Marc Edelman, Upon Further Review: Will the NFL’s Trademark Licensing
Practices Survive Full Antitrust Scrutiny? The Remand of American Needle v. Nat’l Football
League, 16 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 183, 197-200 (2011) (explaining that “[i]n accordance with
long established precedent, a court may review any purportedly anticompetitive [conduct]
under one of three ‘general standards’”—a per se test reserved for conduct that, on the
surface, is most directly problematic; a quick look Rule of Reason test for conduct that may
be somewhat less problematic; and the full Rule of Reason test for conduct where potential
procompetitive benefits need to be reviewed most carefully).
328. See id. at 199-200; see also Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 202 (“The fact that [professional
sports] teams share an interest in making the entire league successful and profitable, and
that they must cooperate in the production and scheduling of games, provides a perfectly
sensible justification for making a host of collective decisions.”).
329. See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 203; see also Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 8 (2006)
(holding that “the pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture do not fall within the narrow”
scope of per se analysis under section 1 of the Sherman Act).
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professional sports league;330 an economic assessment of the
competitive effects of centralized data licensing practices on data
consumers within all relevant markets; and the degree of consumer
harm that is caused by leagues collectivizing ownership rights in
sports data.331
2. Legal Precedent
The practice of sports leagues collectivizing the ownership and
sale of sports data is a matter of first impression for the courts.
Nevertheless, one can turn to reasonable analogs, both inside and
outside of the sports industry, to help assess the underlying eco-
nomic effects of this practice.332 Perhaps the closest analog to the
league-wide collectivization of sports data ownership is the NFL’s
longstanding practice of offering only centralized, exclusive licenses
for the use of individual team trademarks for use on parapher-
nalia.333 In American Needle, the district court, upon remand from
the Supreme Court, held that this practice presented bona fide
issues of material fact as to whether the NFL teams had collectively
restrained trade in “the wholesale market for NFL trademarked
hats,” of which the NFL teams collectively had 100 percent, when it
imposed the requirement that hat manufacturers exclusively
negotiate for a license to use one or more NFL team marks at the
central, league level.334 While the district court in American Needle
330. See Edelman, supra note 327, at 200-01 (explaining that market power, which is “the
power to control prices or exclude competition,” may be established either by looking at actual
marketplace data or by basing it on secondary economist reports).
331. See id. at 201 (explaining that an assessment of whether there exists net anticom-
petitive effects requires a balancing of anticompetitive effects and procompetitive benefits).
In balancing competitive effects, a potential plaintiff would have “the initial burden to prove
that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive effect that harms consumers
in [a] relevant market.” Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018). If the plaintiff
meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate “a procompetitive
rationale for the restraint.” Id. Meanwhile, if the defendant can show a procompetitive
rationale, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate the procompetitive
efficiencies may be achieved through a less anticompetitive alternative. Id.
332. See infra notes 337-41 and accompanying text.
333. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, No. 04-cv-7806, 2014 WL 1364022,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2014), remanded from Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560
U.S. 183 (2010) (discussing this very restraint).
334. Id. at *2. There, the court rejected the NFL’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss
on grounds that American Needle failed to show a relevant market, finding that American
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ordered a trial on this issue, the parties ultimately settled prior to
final adjudication—leaving a final decision on the factual merits
undetermined.335 Nevertheless, the league-wide licensing arrange-
ment was very much called into doubt by the district court’s
rejection of the NFL’s motion for summary judgment—a result that
led the NFL to ultimately enter into a settlement somewhat reform-
ing its centralized trademark licensing practices.336
A second Supreme Court case that similarly draws upon the issue
of sports leagues collectivizing the ownership and sale of team-based
property rights is the seminal 1984 ruling in National Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma—a
case where the Supreme Court held the National Collegiate Athletic
Association’s (NCAA) efforts to collectivize football television
broadcast rights, for purposes of exclusive resale on a national level,
outright violated federal antitrust laws.337 Decided twenty-six years
before American Needle, the Supreme Court in Board of Regents
rejected NCAA member schools’ assignment of their television
broadcast rights to a centralized NCAA committee because doing so
both created a limitation on output and precluded any individual ne-
gotiation for broadcast rights with NCAA member schools.338
By contrast, the Supreme Court in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, Inc. rejected an antitrust challenge to
the collective licensing of individual composers, authors, and
publishers—holding that the pooling of individual musical compos-
ers, authors, and publishers’ copyrights for purposes of offering a
blanket music license was, under a full Rule of Reason analysis,
procompetitive.339 The underlying economic analysis in Broadcast
Needle produced more than sufficient evidence to proceed to trial on the argument that the
market to sell NFL team hats was distinct from the market to sell hats bearing other
professional sports team logos. See id. at *3. 
335. See Marc Edelman, American Needle Settles Antitrust Lawsuit with the NFL,
Preventing an Important Sports Law Trial, FORBES (Mar. 3, 2015, 10:30 AM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2015/03/03/american-needle-settles-antitrust-lawsuit-with-the-
nfl-preventing-an-important-sports-law-trial/ [https://perma.cc/6BVM-94H2]; see also Ken
Belson, N.F.L. and American Needle Agree to Settle Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/sports/football/nfl-and-american-needle-agree-to-settle-
lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/7LYY-DARP].
336. See Edelman, supra note 335.
337. 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
338. Id. at 99.
339. 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979).
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Music, however, is distinguishable from both American Needle and
Board of Regents in at least three important ways. First, in
Broadcast Music, the individual musical composers, authors, and
publishers that participated in the group license granted their
membership association “nonexclusive rights to license [their] ...
performances.”340 Thus, they retained the right to license the
copyrights to their own works independently from the collective
association outside of the context of the group license.341
Second, in the context of the group license, the potential purchas-
ers of the right to play certain copyrighted music in Broadcast Music
still had the choice of working with two different associations—
ASCAP and BMI—both of which continued to compete against one
another to sell group licenses to these artists.342 Thus, even in terms
of negotiating group licenses, potential television and radio stations
were not limited to a single seller for purposes of negotiation, much
as seems to be the case in at least some sports leagues’ data
licensing policies.
Finally, from a practical matter, one can argue that there is a
distinction between the level of efficiencies generated from aggre-
gating the copyrights to thousands of different musical composers,
authors, and publishers, and aggregating the rights of just thirty or
thirty-two independent professional sports teams.343 Indeed, it
would likely be comparatively easier for a licensed sports gambling
operator to secure the rights from thirty or thirty-two different
teams to use their real-time player data than it would be for a
television or radio station to secure the rights from thousands of
individual performers to play their music on the air.
340. Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 5. 
341. See Edelman, supra note 327, at 215 (discussing the nonexclusive nature of either the
ASCAP or BMI license in Broadcast Music).
342. Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 5 (explaining that most radio and television licensees
purchase licenses from both ASCAP and BMI).
343. See Edelman, supra note 327, at 214-15 (discussing the likely differences in efficiency
that emerge from pooling together the rights of thousands of different musical workers and
those of just a limited number of professional sports teams within a given league).
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3. Likely Competitive Effects of Centralized League Data
Policies
Turning back to the Rule of Reason assessment of sports leagues
collectivizing the ownership and sale of sports data, one could point
to specific potential anticompetitive effects of this practice similar
in nature to those found by courts in American Needle and Board of
Regents. Most notably, when a sports league adopts an exclusive
league-wide policy for licensing aggregated data, it precludes a
potential purchaser from licensing the rights to aggregated statisti-
cal data from just a single team.344 Thus, much as how American
Needle was forbidden by NFL policy from purchasing a license to
use the trademarks of only a single team—such as the New Orleans
Saints—on paraphernalia, in terms of league-wide data sale and
licensing policies, “a gaming company that wants to offer betting
exclusively on Los Angeles Dodgers games [or New York Knicks
games] might be forced to buy statistical feeds from the league
overall, and not directly from the Dodgers [or Knicks].”345 As a
result, this could potentially increase sports gaming operators’ costs
by denying them the opportunity to purchase the data of one team
against another team based in the same league.346 If the gaming
operator is a smaller company, the need to purchase the statistical
feeds from all of the teams in the league may drive the operator out
of business, or may make it too expensive for them to launch their
business in the first instance.
The efforts by sports leagues to collectivize the ownership and
sale of sports data, however, also might produce at least four types
of procompetitive benefits. First, to the extent that most gaming
operators wish to acquire the aggregated data from an entire sports
league and not just a few teams, a centralized, league-wide licensing
system would substantially reduce “transaction costs”347 for many
would-be licensees.348 Indeed, not only would it expedite the process
344. See Edelman, supra note 11.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MICHAEL H. SCHILL &
LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, PROPERTY 48 (8th ed. 2014) (defining “transaction costs” as “costs
of arranging an offer”).
348. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 303 (2d Cir.
2008).
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of securing all of the desired rights, but it would mitigate the risk of
an individual team owner holding out or demanding an unusually
high fee from a gaming operator, knowing full well that acquiring
the rights to use statistical data for all of the teams in a league is
likely to have far greater value than if the data for just a few
teams is missing.349
Second, while the centralized sale of sports data erodes intra-
league competition, it may arguably enhance interleague competi-
tion by pitting the individual sports leagues against one another
when gaming operators decide whose data to purchase.350 For ex-
ample, if a sports betting operator or online daily fantasy sports
contest is debating between using aggregated data derived from the
NBA or the NHL but not both, even when centralizing their sale of
data, these leagues may find themselves competing for that cus-
tomer.351 While this is a novel issue in the context of the licensing of
aggregated sports data, the Second Ciruit Court of Appeals opined
in Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc. that in
the market of licensing team trademarks for the making of pro-
motional items, MLB teams compete in licensing their trademarks
not only against each other but also against “other sports entities
such as the NBA, the NFL, the NHL, [and] NASCAR.”352
A third potential, albeit far more dubious, benefit of league-wide
licensing of statistical data may theoretically lie in enhancing on-
field competitive balance within the league overall by facilitating
the even split of all data-generated revenues between all of the
349. For an example of a professional sports team engaging in the act of holdout with
respect to a licensing arrangement absent league-wide mandate, see Major League Baseball
Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d 542 F.3d 290 (2d
Cir. 2008) (discussing the Houston Astros’s decision to refuse to participate in the league-wide
licensing of their intellectual property rights for purposes of making a set of baseball cards
encompassing all players, across all MLB teams). 
350. See Major League Baseball Props., 542 F.3d at 299 (noting the potential interleague
competition for the licensing of rights to use team logos on promotional products).
351. For a discussion of potential interleague competition in various sports product
markets as a potential affirmative defense to a league-wide restraint, see id. at 328-31
(recognizing the possibility that the proper relevant market for licensing intellectual property
rights for Bammers (plush bears) was far broader than just MLB teams); Chi. Pro. Sports Ltd.
v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that the NBA’s
collective licensing of game broadcasts may yield procompetitive benefits within a broader
market for selling the rights to television programming).
352. 542 F.3d at 299.
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league’s teams.353 While courts have long rejected the notion of
improved competitive balance as justification for a sports league’s
restraints in labor markets,354 there is a possibility that some courts
may adopt a more open-minded view to the competitive balance
argument when used to defend restraints involving product
markets.355 For example, the Supreme Court stated in American
Needle that “making [an] entire league successful and profitable ...
provides a perfectly sensible justification for making a host of
collective decisions.”356 Nevertheless, despite the Court’s language
in American Needle which seems to raise the possibility that
fostering competitive balance may constitute a procompetitive
benefit under antitrust laws, longstanding antitrust precedent
makes clear that there must be a direct nexus to a financial benefit
to consumers emanating from any alleged defense of a restraint
based on procompetitive effects.357 Absent evidence that the teams
benefiting from equal sharing of sports data revenues are poor-
performing on-field teams that would invest more money into player
labor with better access to revenues, the argument does not have
much legal traction.358 Furthermore, even without centralizing
353. See James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports Antitrust
Claims After American Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 550 (2011) (arguing from the
perspective of an antitrust lawyer at a large national law firm that represents the interests
of large companies and joint ventures, including professional sports leagues, that “[c]om-
petitive balance ... may provide procompetitive justifications for ... league rules or polices,
particularly when the restrictions relate to the integrity of the game or apply to markets for
the downstream product offerings of the professional sports league”).
354. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2015)
(rejecting a college sports league’s alleged competitive benefit of enhanced competitive balance
absent evidence the underlying restraint of trade actually had enhanced competitive balance).
355. See, e.g., McKeown, supra note 353, at 549-50 (broadly differentiating competitive
balance as an antitrust defense when used to justify a league’s collective selling or licensing
of “downstream product[s],” rather than labor-side restraints implemented outside of the
scope of collective bargaining).
356. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 202 (2010); see also Chi. Pro.
Sports Ltd., 95 F.3d at 604 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (“Such a balance is needed to ensure that
the league provides high quality entertainment throughout the season so as to optimize
competition with other forms of entertainment.”).
357. See Edelman, supra note 327, at 216-17. See generally Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688, 693-94 (1978) (explaining that general policy considerations
such as safety cannot be considered as a procompetitive benefit under a proper antitrust
analysis).
358. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting a
competitive balance argument to justify the NFL’s draft under the Rule of Reason analysis);
Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 621-22 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that the NFL’s
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league data rights, there are far less restrictive means that a sports
league could use to promote competitive balance in a sports league,
such as revenue sharing among the teams, without collectivizing
independent property rights.359
Finally, one could even perhaps attempt to argue that the league-
wide licensing arrangement is net procompetitive because, as a
practical matter, there really is little to no consumer demand for
aggregated data of just a single professional sports team within a
league—thereby making such a purported market, in itself, rel-
evantly obsolete. Indeed, while there is strong evidence of a viable
market for companies to sell shirts, hats, and other apparel with
just single-team logos,360 further economic analysis is needed to
assess the true viability of a business model where consumers bet
on sporting events based on the data derived from some, but not all,
of the games in a given league. While the gravamen of the above
analysis presumes there is a viable market to purchase sports data
in which individual teams within a league are competitors to sell
their data but teams across sports leagues are not, it is possible that
the acquisition of the game data for a single team might, based on
economic evidence, prove to be a standalone market (for example,
acquiring the rights to Los Angeles Dodgers data is not part of the
same market as acquiring the rights to San Francisco Giants data).
Likewise, based on economic evidence, the acquisition of the game
data for a single team might prove to be a market broader in scope
than just a given sports league (for example, the rights to Los
Angeles Dodgers data may be part of the same market as rights to
rule restricting free movement of players not under contract between teams cannot be saved
based on the purported argument that the rule improved competitive balance). See generally
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072 (accepting the district court’s finding that while compensation
rules could theoretically constitute a procompetitive balance, the NCAA failed to show that
its rules limiting college athlete pay actually promote competitive balance in terms of their
economic effects).
359. See generally Stephen F. Ross & Benjamin Woodworth, More Like the United Nations
than McDonald’s: Economic and Policy Aspects of the NFL Labor Dispute, PA STATE INST. FOR
SPORTS L., POL’Y & RSCH. 1, 9, https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/Sports%20Law%20Policy%
20and%20Research%20Institute/More_Like_the_United_Nations.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7TS-
C96H] (“Designing revenue sharing schemes is always a delicate balance to achieve desired
competitive balance among teams, while preserving the incentive for individual club
initiative.”).
360. See Edelman, supra note 327, at 192.
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Los Angeles Lakers, Los Angeles Chargers, Los Angeles Kings, or
even Los Angeles Galaxy data).
Under a proper section 1 Sherman Act analysis, when there are
both significant anticompetitive and procompetitive effects to a
given restraint, a court may then consider whether the objectives of
the restraint may be achieved by a less restrictive alternative or,
conversely, balance the anticompetitive effects of the restraint
against its procompetitive benefits.361 While substantial fact finding
and economic analysis would go into this stage of the inquiry, a
strong argument could be made that even if there are bona fide pro-
competitive benefits to sports leagues’ collective ownership and sale
of sports data, these benefits could largely be achieved in a less
restrictive manner.362 Specifically, these benefits could stem from
allowing the occasional would-be purchaser of data who prefers to
buy data from just a single team (or a few teams) in a sports league,
to acquire these rights from the teams themselves, rather than from
the league overall.363 By allowing theoretical purchasers of sports
data to choose between purchasing rights on a team-by-team basis
or purchasing a blanket license from the league overall, such a
league-wide data policy comes far closer to resembling the music
licensing arrangement that was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Broadcast Music, Inc.364 Additionally, this purchasing option dif-
ferentiates sports data from both the broadcast rights licensing
system overruled by the Supreme Court in Board of Regents and the
NFL team trademark licensing system that was called into doubt in
American Needle.365
361. See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century,
16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 827 (2009).
362. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958
F.3d 1239, 1251 (9th Cir. 2020), aff’d sub. nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141
S. Ct. 2141 (2021) (explaining that in the third stage of a Rule of Reason antitrust analysis,
a court will consider if there are ways that are “less restrictive but virtually as effective” in
attaining the procompetitive benefits advocated for by the antitrust defendants).
363. See id. 
364. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979).
365. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 92
(1984); Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, No. 04-cv-7806, 2014 WL 1364022, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2014), remanded from Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183
(2010).
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4. Antitrust Exemptions and Other Mitigating Factors
Beyond the bona fide (albeit perhaps weak) antitrust arguments
that sports leagues may attempt to make in support of collectivizing
their data rights, there are a series of other legal arguments that
may exempt, or perhaps otherwise justify, collective league behavior
in centralizing data licensing, even where these practices may
otherwise be anticompetitive. First, as unseemly as it may be, the
collective lobbying of state governments for favorable laws in terms
of data rights, and the collectivizing of the sale of sports data for
specific purposes of complying with state laws, are both likely be-
yond the scope of the Sherman Act.366 Moreover, if it becomes law in
any given state that licensed sports gambling operators must pur-
chase their contest data from the underlying sports leagues, a
licensed gambling operator that does business in a state maintain-
ing such a data mandate would probably not have an antitrust claim
for paying an amount above the free market price to secure data in
compliance with state law.367
Second, MLB has historically enjoyed some degree of an exemp-
tion from federal antitrust laws based on a well-known trilogy of
Supreme Court decisions, culminating with the Court’s 1972 de-
cision in Flood v. Kuhn.368 However, based on somewhat ambiguous
language in the Flood decision, lower courts continue to disagree
about whether MLB’s historic antitrust exemption, as adopted by
the Supreme Court, relates only to the league’s player reserve sys-
tem (the source of the dispute in Flood) or to broader aspects of the
business of MLB.369 Even after Congress’s passing of the Curt Flood
366. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 555-56 (2014)
(explaining that under what has become known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, “defendants
are immune from antitrust liability for engaging in conduct ... aimed at influencing deci-
sionmaking by the government”); see also Smiley, supra note 16 (quoting one of this Article’s
authors, Marc Edelman, as explaining that “[a]s unseemly as it may seem, there is a complete
antitrust exemption for companies that jointly petition Congress or a state government for
more favorable terms, and, once a state mandates particular conduct, the harm is no longer
clearly antitrust in nature”); Rodenberg, supra note 299, at 39-41 (discussing the exemption
under federal antitrust laws for state-authorized monopolies).
367. See Smiley, supra note 16 (quoting one of this Article’s authors, Marc Edelman).
368. 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972); see also Smiley, supra note 16.
369. See, e.g., Charles Matthew Burns, Note, The Scope of Major League Baseball’s
Antitrust Exemption, 24 STETSON L. REV. 495, 515-17 (1995) (discussing disagreement about
the scope of MLB’s antitrust exemption in the aftermath of Flood v. Kuhn); Nathaniel Grow,
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Act in 1998 with the effort of clarifying the scope of MLB’s historic
antitrust exemption, such uncertainty remains.370 Thus, it is pos-
sible—but probably not likely—that a court would find the practice
of MLB teams selling their rights to their league data exclusively on
a central league level also to be beyond the scope of the Sherman
Act.371
Third, certain uniquely structured sports leagues such as the
XFL, which are true single entities, may not even be subject to
section 1 of the Sherman Act.372 This issue is discussed in far more
detail in Part IV.A of this Article with respect to the presence, or
absence, of “concerted action.”373
While these potential exemptions and mitigating factors may
seem like a copout from holding certain sports leagues’ otherwise
anticompetitive practices subject to proper antitrust scrutiny, it is
important to remember that even where a sports league may bene-
fit from an exemption from liability under section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the league still may be found to have illegally monopolized a
market under section 2 of the Sherman Act.374 The final Part of this
Article thus turns to the question of whether any sports leagues are
leveraging their monopolies over hosting sporting events into new
monopolies over sports data markets. Indeed, if proven, such con-
duct could lead to antitrust liability under a monopolization theory
for even a professional sports league that is able to escape liability
under a collusion theory.
V. THE MONOPOLIZATION OF SPORTS DATA
In addition to antitrust issues that may arise from league-wide
sale of game data under section 1 of the Sherman Act, league
The Curiously Confounding Curt Flood Act, 90 TUL. L. REV. 859, 869-72 (2016) (describing
splits in the lower courts with respect to the scope of MLB’s antitrust exemption).
370. See Grow, supra note 369, at 900 (“[W]hen properly read, the [Curt Flood Act] neither
codifies, nor reflects congressional acquiescence in, any particular view of baseball’s
exemption. As a result ... the judiciary largely retains the power to shape the scope of
baseball’s antitrust immunity as it sees fit.”).
371. See id. (explaining that the Curt Flood Act does not seem to likely provide any true
answers about the scope of MLB’s historic exemption).
372. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 200-01 (2010). 
373. See supra Part IV.A.
374. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1948) (explaining the distinctions
in legal claims lying under section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act).
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policies that impede private companies from independently col-
lecting and selling or licensing game data may further present legal
concerns under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The primary distinc-
tion between sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act is that while
“[s]ection 1 applies only to concerted action that restrains trade,”
section 2 “covers both concerted and independent action, but only if
that action ‘monopolize[s]’ ... or ‘threatens actual monopolization.’”375
Thus, while the scope of section 2 is in some ways broader than
section 1 (for example, there is no need for a plaintiff to establish
concerted action), it is in other ways narrower (for example,
monopoly power requires a far greater market power threshold).376
To state a claim for monopolization under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, one must show both possession of monopoly power and
engagement in some form of exclusionary conduct.377 In this vein,
having monopoly power, in itself, does not violate section 2 of the
Sherman Act.378 Rather, an alleged wrongdoer must further have
acquired or expanded that monopoly through illegitimate means.379
Section A of this Part explores whether the teams within a profes-
sional sports league are likely to collectively have “monopoly power.”
Section B then analyzes, presuming the presence of monopoly power
in any relevant market, whether professional sports leagues might
375. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 190 (first alteration in original) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Griffith, 334 U.S. at 106-07 (“Section 2 [of the Sherman
Act] is not restricted to conspiracies or combinations to monopolize but also makes it a crime
for any person to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize any part of interstate or foreign
trade or commerce.”).
376. See Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 190 (comparing section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman
Act).
377. See PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON S. EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 396 (7th ed. 2013) (explaining that “monopolization entails
something more than monopoly”); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429
(2d Cir. 1945) (“[S]ize does not determine guilt; ... there must be such ‘exclusion’ of
competitors.”); cf. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (explaining
that the offense of monopolization requires: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historical accident”).
378. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 430 (“Mere size ... is not an offense against the
Sherman Act.” (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932))).
379. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 377, at 396; Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 429
(noting that it is not a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act where a monopoly has simply
been “thrust upon” a company).
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engage in any “exclusionary conduct” with the effect of expanding
their legally generated monopolies.380
A. Do Sports Leagues Have Monopoly Power Over Any Relevant
Market?
The term “monopoly power” as used under section 2 of the
Sherman Act is fundamentally different from “market power,” as
referenced earlier, in the context of a section 1 Sherman Act
analysis.381 “Monopoly power,” as a general matter, has been
interpreted to mean “the power to control prices and exclude
competition.”382 Alternatively, some courts have defined “monopoly
power” as the ability to “raise prices substantially above the
competitive level.”383 Although high market shares are not direct
evidence of monopoly power,384 Judge Learned Hand famously wrote
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America that a market share
of ninety percent “is enough to constitute a monopoly;” whereas, “it
is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and
certainly thirty-three per cent is not.”385
To determine the presence of “monopoly power,” under section 2
of the Sherman Act, one must first define the relevant market,
which must, like under a section 1 inquiry, include “all products
reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes.”386
When looking at the market structure of the United States’
professional sports industry, one can make a very strong argument
that each United States premier professional sports league collec-
tively exercises a monopoly over hosting the highest level of sporting
contests in its respective sport.387 For example, the NFL collectively
380. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 429.
381. See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
382. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
383. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
384. See generally Louis Kaplow, Market Share Thresholds: On the Conflation of Empirical
Assessments and Legal Policy Judgments, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 243, 244 (2011)
(“Market shares do not constitute answers to questions about market power. To assume
otherwise involves a categor[ical] mistake.”).
385. 148 F.2d at 424.
386. See generally Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 52 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
387. See Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 647 (1989)
(“[M]onopoly sports leagues or their member teams exercise monopoly power.”).
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has nearly 100 percent of the market in the hosting of premier,
professional football games in the United States.388 This is shown by
the fact that, even despite various recent attempts by entrepreneurs
to launch rival, high level professional sports leagues, the NFL’s
storied history, access to premier stadium venues, and rules
prohibiting member teams from staging games against teams
outside of the league, have prevented lower ticket-priced leagues
from taking away a significant in-game or television market share
from the NFL.389 Similarly, the NBA collectively enjoys nearly 100
percent of the market for hosting premier, professional basketball
games in the United States, as presumably does MLB for hosting
American baseball games and the NHL for hosting American hockey
games.390
From time to time academics have floated the argument that the
government should respond to this monopoly power of the profes-
sional sports leagues in their given sport by breaking these leagues
into smaller, competitive ventures.391 However, the mere access of
388. See id. at 645 (“The [NFL] achieved its monopoly status in 1966 when Congress
enacted a specific statute permitting the league to merge with its one major rival, the
American Football League.”).
389. Rodger Sherman, The AAF Failed Because All Minor League Football Does, RINGER
(Apr. 4, 2019, 6:10 AM), https://www.theringer.com/nfl/2019/4/4/18294528/american-alliance-
football-aaf-collapse-suspend-xfl [https://perma.cc/6HBH-KFB5] (explaining why the American
Alliance of Football was unable to survive in the same general market as the NFL); Jim
Reineking, Alliance of American Football Is Just the Latest in a Long Line of Failed Start-Up
Leagues, USA TODAY (Apr. 3, 2019, 7:36 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/
2019/04/03/aaf-joins-xfl-usfl-wfl-start-up-pro-football-leagues-failed/3349422002/ [https://
perma.cc/HBD4-EGZG] (providing a long list of failed U.S. professional football leagues and
attempting to explain some rationale for their failure).
390. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 891 (1999) (“The NFL, NBA, NHL and Major League Baseball ...
have sustained a monopoly position that allows them to obtain undue profits from sports fans
and taxpayers.”); Ross, supra note 387, at 646 n.14 (expressing the perspective that MLB is
a monopoly, and leaving open the possibility that the NBA and NHL are too). But see Thane
N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging
Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIA. L. REV. 729, 816 (1987) (rejecting the idea that each
professional sport constitutes its own antitrust market for the purpose of hosting exhibitions
and concluding instead that “[t]he modern era of professional sports is characterized as one
in which sports entertainment competes among a vast array of equally attractive leisure
activities”—a view that looks at each league that hosts a given sports competition as holding
just a small part of the entertainment exhibition marketplace).
391. For two very good articles regarding the argument to breakup professional sports
leagues into competing economic joint ventures for each sport, see Ross, supra note 387, at
646, and Piraino, supra note 390, at 891.
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these leagues to monopolies in the market for hosting premier
events in a given sport would not, in itself, be grounds for breaking
up these leagues—at least to the extent their monopolies over the
market to host premier sporting events in their given sport arise
from the superior nature of their product or business acumen of
team ownership.392 The legal problem only lies when these leagues
begin to engage in exclusionary conduct that attempts to forestall
new competition.393 This, among other things, could include efforts
to expand their legally garnered monopoly over hosting sporting
events into monopolies in other markets such as, for example, the
market for selling or licensing sports data.
B. Do Sports Leagues’ Data Policies Entail Exclusionary Conduct?
Recognizing that if a United States professional sports league
were to have a monopoly over hosting sporting events in a given
sport, that league could not then engage in exclusionary conduct to
forestall new competition, the question next turns to whether any
of the United States professional sports leagues’ policies with
respect to data may constitute the type of “exclusionary conduct”
that is impermissible given monopoly power in an event hosting
market.
There are multiple types of exclusionary conduct that would
violate section 2 of the Sherman Act in which the actor has monop-
oly power.394 One form of exclusionary conduct is “leveraging,” which
takes place when a monopolist “leverage[s] its power to extend its
monopoly into other markets and thereby increase[s] the social
harm caused by the initial monopoly.”395 One of the most famous
cases in which a court has found a company with monopoly power
in one market to have impermissibly leveraged that monopoly into
392. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
393. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447-48 (2009) (“Simply
possessing monopoly power and charging monopoly prices does not violate § 2 [of the Sherman
Act]; rather, the statute targets the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
394. For a series of examples of conduct that courts have traditionally deemed “exclu-
sionary” under federal antitrust law, see Frank X. Schoen, Note, Exclusionary Conduct after
Trinko, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1625, 1646-49 (2005).
395. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 377, at 410.
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a potential monopoly in a second market was United States v.
Microsoft Corp.396 There, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ex-
plained that Microsoft violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by
making it impracticable for users of Microsoft’s operating system to
use the Netscape Navigator internet browser with the Microsoft
operating system rather than Microsoft Explorer, with the goal of
leveraging Microsoft’s legitimate monopoly over operating systems
into a second monopoly over browsers.397
In the context of today’s professional sports leagues, certain
league policies in the sale of rights to game data may similarly be
viewed as an effort to leverage a monopoly in one market (the
market for hosting games in a single sport) into a monopoly in a
second market (data collection and sale/licensing). For example,
according to multiple public sources, the MLB teams, in addition to
collectivizing their sports data rights, have agreed to make sports-
books that use exclusively their data into “Authorized Gaming
Operators” by granting them exclusive access to “media and content
extension opportunities and product integration through MLB.
TV.”398 This promotion sounds like a healthy thing when expressed
by MLB as an “opportunity.”399 However, when looked at in a more
neutral light, MLB is, in essence, precluding those sportsbooks that
seek to acquire their sports data from other sources from purchasing
media extensions and product integrations without also buying
MLB’s data—a form of tying or exclusionary conduct that is
reasonably comparable with the type of conduct found by the courts
to be potentially impermissible in Microsoft.400 To the extent that
sports leagues with monopolies over hosting events in a given sport
engage in this type of conduct, it would perhaps justify the Depart-
ment of Justice bringing a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act
against those particular leagues, at least so long as the underlying
leagues are not the beneficiary of any special antitrust exemption
that would negate such a claim.
396. 253 F.3d 34, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
397. Id. at 65-66.
398. Lucas, supra note 298, at 1542 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
399. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 65-67; see also Lucas, supra note 298, at 1561 (explaining
a statement by a MLB executive responsible for gaming and data policy that sportsbooks that
did not use “official game data would not ‘be around for long’”).
400. 253 F.3d at 85.
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CONCLUSION
Data has long played an important role in professional sports—
allowing commentators, fans, and managers to better analyze player
and team performance.401 In recent years, however, the emergence
of legalized sports betting has greatly increased the value of sports
data.402 As a result, United States professional sports leagues have
increasingly sought to gain control over sports data markets.403
Although United States professional sports leagues generally lack
intellectual property rights to prevent competitors from collecting,
aggregating, and selling sports data,404 some sports leagues have
attempted to gain control over the markets for sports data by
freezing out competition through league-wide data licensing policies
and selling media rights exclusively in conjunction with league
data.405 While innovative, these business practices may potentially
be seen as having anticompetitive effects under federal antitrust
laws.406
While the United States professional sports leagues could legally
gain control over sports data markets by developing superior data
products or selling their data for a better price, leagues are not
allowed to gain control over sports data markets by engaging in
anticompetitive or exclusionary business practices.407 Thus, it is
imperative for antitrust regulators to pay careful attention to the
business practices of United States professional sports leagues to
ensure that they do not harm free markets for selling sports data.
If antitrust regulators are lax in enforcing competition law in
sports data markets, there is a reasonable chance that United
States professional sports leagues will monopolize sports data
markets by engaging in anticompetitive and exclusionary practices.
In turn, this would lead to an increase in the price to acquire sports
data and a decrease in quality of available data. These outcomes
401. See supra Part II.C.
402. See Rybaltowski, supra note 184 (discussing the cost of official league data packages).
403. Smiley, supra note 16.
404. See supra Part III.A. 
405. See supra Part V.
406. See supra Part V.
407. See supra Parts IV-V.
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would not only harm consumer welfare, but also would detract from
the long-term viability and competitiveness of the United States
legal sports betting market. Thus, if United States antitrust
regulators allow professional sports leagues to monopolize sports
data, it would not serve the best interests of either the economy
or society overall.
